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NOTES

A Technological Dream Turned Legal
Nightmare: Potential Liability of the
United States Under the Federal Tort
Claims Act for Operating the Global
Positioning System
ABSTRAcT

The U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS) provides
precise positioning information to anyone in the world,
regardlessof nationality, as long as they have access to an
inexpensive receiver. However, in managing and providing
the GPS for no charge, the United States may have opened
itself to worldwide tort exposure. This Note analyzes U.S.
liability for negligently operating the GPS under the Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA)in four categories.
First, this Note examines the transformationof the GPS
from its domestic military beginnings to its current role as the
foremost radionavigationtechnique in history and as a vital
tool to civilians across the world. Relying on historical data
and the GPS's rapid expansion, this Note establishes how
negligent GPS operation by the United States could harm a
non-American outside of the United States.
Second, this Note addresses the applicability of the
FTCA's foreign country exception to a lawsuit arising from
negligent GPS operation. This second section argues that the
foreign country exception should probably not prevent the
lawsuitfrom progressing.
Third, this Note surveys and analyzes U.S. Supreme
Court and U.S. Courts of Appeals caselaw to determine the
applicability of the FTCA's discretionaryfunction exception to
this lawsuit. It then reveals the crucial issues relevant to a
GPS lawsuit under the FTCA's discretionary function
exception.
This Note concludes by stating that Congress should
exempt the GPS from FTCA liability because of the
devastating effect unparalleledglobal liability would have on
the planet'spreeminent navigationaldevice.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Pick up the phone and dial 1-703-313-5907.1 After two
rings, a recorded message curtly announces the availability of
items listed by an alphanumeric sequence. 2 The voice then gives
3
the expected downtime of these objects calibrated to ZULU time.
This constantly updated message concludes with additional
4
information relevant to these items.
This recording does not relay information concerning an alien
landing, the expected impact of an asteroid with earth, or a secret
military code but instead provides information essential to more
than a million people across the globe. 5 This mysterious message
updates the status of the Global Positioning System (GPS).6 The

1.
See TOM LOGSDON, UNDERSTANDING THE NAVSTAR: GPS, GIS, IVHS 278
(2d ed. 1995). This telephone number is the Civil Global Positioning System
Information Service Center's (CGPSISC) 24-hour recorded hotline located in the
United States of America. See id. The Service Center is manned 24 hours a day,
365 days a year by U.S. Coast Guard personnel to answer specific inquiries by
telephone, facsimile, and electronic mail. See id. The number functioned as of
the publication of this Note. See Recorded Message of Current GPS Status as
provided by CGPSISC (accessed Feb. 29, 2000) [hereinafter Recorded Message].
2.
See Recorded Message, supra note 1. Each alphanumeric sequence
begins with PRN. See id. PRN is an acronym for PseudoRandom Number code.
See LOGSDON, supranote 1, at 278. The PRN number indexes the satellites in the
Global Positioning System (GPS) constellation. See id.; see also infra note 88 and
accompanying text. PRN classifies the spectrum of signals that emit from each
satellite. See Glossary, OPS World, (visited Jan. 22, 2000) <http://www.gpsworld.
com/resources/glossary.htm>. For a listing of every satellite used in the GPS
since its inception, indexed by PRN number, see United States Coast Guard
SATINFO, (visited Jan. 22, 2000) <http://www.navcen.uscg.mil/gps/geninfo/
constell.htm.>
3.
See Recorded Message, supra note 1. ZULU time is also known as
Greenwich Mean Time. See GMT: Greenwich Time (visited Jan. 22, 2000)
<http://www.greenwich2000.com/time>.
4.
See Recorded Message, supra note 1.
5.
See Departments
of
Defense
and Transportation,
Federal
Radionavigation Plan 3-3 (1996) [hereinafter Radionavigation Plan]. For an online
version of the Federal Radionavigation Plan in PDF or HTML format, see
Departments of Defense and Transportation, 1996 Federal RadionaigationPlan
(visited Jan. 22, 2000) <http://www.navcen.uscg.mil/policy/frp1996/>.
6.
See Recorded Message, supra note 1. While the system is generally
referred to as Global Positioning System, it is often called the Navstar Global
Positioning System because it employs the Air Force's Navstar satellites. See
LOGSDON, supra note 1, at 137. For one of the most comprehensive and detailed
sources of GPS information, see United States Coast Guard Navigation Center
(visited Jan. 22, 2000) <http://www.navcen.uscg.mil>. The site contains general
explanatory information regarding GPS and all of its related systems, countless
technical documents detailing the past and current status of the GPS, and links to
other GPS websites. See id. For a comprehensive printed resource, see the
monthly magazine GPS WORLD.
GPS WORLD provides articles on the latest
developments, uses, and products related to the GPS. GPS WORLD also has a
website at (visited Jan. 22, 2000) <http://www.gpsworld.com>.
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GPS is a navigational tool that fixes a position anywhere on earth
but with a few more 'bells and whistles" than your average
7
compass and map.
Relying on GPS information, pilots land commercial airliners,
mariners negotiate the stormy seas of the North Atlantic,
architects determine where to build the world's next skyscrapers,
motorists navigate through unknown cities, and hikers transverse
uncharted terrain. 8 What began as a tool for the U.S. military to
provide precise positioning for its targeting systems, such as

7.
While all of the technical aspects that enable the GPS to function
exceed the scope of this Note, the logic of the system is straightforward. The GPS
is a constellation of 24 Navstar satellites orbiting at 10,898 nautical miles above
the earth. See LOGSDON, supra note 1, at 13-15. Twenty-one of those satellites
are operational, while three serve as spares. See id. Several satellites focus on
every location on the earth at all times. See id.
Once activated, a GPS receiver acquires a signal from one of the satellites
covering that location at that time. See id. To calculate the distance from the
satellite to the receiver, the receiver uses the equation: distance = rate * time. See
id. Since the speed of light is a known constant and the pulses between the
satellite and receiver travel at the speed of light, the rate can always be calculated.
See id. The GPS receiver provides its location in three dimensions: altitude,
longitude, and latitude. See id. Consequently, the receiver requires three
satellites to calculate its position. See id. The receiver knows the exact location of
the satellites in space by the ephemeris constants relayed back by each satellite.
See id. An ephemeris constant is the fixed path of an orbiting space object such
as a planet or artificial satellite. See id. In other words, once a satellite achieves
orbit, it always knows its location as long as ground control updates the satellites
with correct ephemeris data. See id. However, the time variables in the distance
= rate * time equations between GPS satellite and GPS receiver require the use of a
fourth satellite. See id.
Satellites carry extremely precise onboard atomic clocks; however, most GPS
receivers are inexpensive (some costing only a few hundred dollars) and employ
the common, yet less accurate, quartz crystal clocks found in watches. See id.
Therefore, the receiver's measurement of the time it took to receive a response
from the satellite is imprecise. See id. A one-billionth of a second error in timing
can result in at least one foot of distance error. See id. But by using a fourth
equation to solve for clock bias, an accurate time measurement can be calculated.
See id. Now there are four equations with four unknowns. See id. By
substituting algebraically and solving the four equations, one can calculate the
three-dimensional position of the receiver. See id. (providing a more detailed
discussion of the mathematics involved).
8.
For discussions of the various uses of the GPS, see generally GPS
TRENDS IN PRECISE TERRESTRIAL, AIRBORNE, AND SPACEBORNE APPLICATIONS (Gerhard

Beutler et al. eds., 1996) (listing the state-of-the-art uses for GPS in surveying,
geodesy, geodynamics, and navigation as of 1995); MICHAEL KENNEDY, THE GLOBAL
POSITIONING SYSTEM AND GIS: AN INTRODUCTION 210-30 (1996); LOGSDON, supranote

1; Jonathan M. Epstein, Global PositioningSystem (GPS): Defining the Legal Issues
of its Expanding Civil Use, 61 J. AIR L. & CoM. 243 (1995) (discussing the
multitude of uses for GPS); Gore Announces Enhancements to Global Positioning
System Benefiting Civilian Users Worldwide, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Mar. 30, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 5684298 (discussing worldwide civilian uses of the GPS)
[hereinafter Gore Announces]; Verne G. Kopytoff, 18 Wheels, G.P.S. and Radar,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1999, at D1, D7 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages
of using GPS to track longhaul truckers).
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nuclear ballistic missile submarines, has become a global
resource that more and more people employ each day. 9 After
spending a couple of hundred dollars to buy a receiver, any
person, regardless of their nationality, can use the system free of
0
charge, courtesy of the U.S. Government and its taxpayers.'
Along with the pride of paying for the world's use of the most
precise navigational tool in history, U.S. taxpayers should also
recognize that this system has exposed the United States to
liability from citizens around the globe." In 1992, the Air Force
inaccurately updated the position of one of the satellites in the
GPS. 12 The resulting error caused a horizontal position error to
GPS receivers that exceeded three hundred meters.' 3
Had a
Belgium citizen been relying on GPS information to land an
airplane at a fogged-in airport in Germany at this time, the
airplane may have crashed into the control tower instead of gently
landing on the airstrip. Consequently, the descendants of the
pilot and the passengers could sue the United States for the
4
negligent operation of the GPS in U.S. federal district court.'

9.
See Epstein, supra note 8, at 248. Revenue from GPS commercial
systems exceeded $3.9 billion in 1998 and is expected to top $15 billion by 2003.
See GPS to Top $15 Billion by 2003, GPS WORLD, Jan. 1999, at 60. In 1994,
revenues for GPS-related products totaled $109.2 million in Western Europe
alone. See Frost & Sullivan Studies Western European GPS Market4 GPS WORLD
SHOWCASE, Aug. 1998, at 58 [hereinafter Frost & Sullivan]. A market survey
predicted that in 2004 sales of GPS-related products in Western Europe will
produce nearly $1 billion in sales. See id. Thus the Western European market for
GPS-related products is expected to grow at a 22.8% annual rate. See id.
10.
See LOGSDON, supra note 1, at 285-92 (listing the names and addresses
of domestic and foreign makers of GPS receivers in order to obtain current prices);
Epstein, supra note 8, at 246 (explaining that the United States would provide
GPS access to civilians); see also GPS World Receiver Survey, GPS WORLD, Jan.
1999, at 36-52 (surveying the prices and specifications of most GPS receivers on
the world market); cf. Glen Gibbons, The GPS Decade, GPS WORLD, Jan. 1999, at
10 (discussing the evolution of GPS and how a GPS receiver in 1990 weighed more
than one pound and cost over $3,000).
11.
See infra Part II.
12.
See D.H. Alsip et al., Implementation of the U.S. Coast Guard's
Differential GPS Navigation Service 1-2 (June 1993) (paper distributed by the U.S.
Coast Guard Navigation Information Service through Fax-on-Demand at (703)
313-5931, Doc. No. 202).
13.
See id.
14.
See generally Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). Foreign
subjects suffering injury outside the United States may still sue an American
defendant in U.S. federal court. See id. The Piper Court eventually removed the
case from U.S. federal court to Scotland based on forum non conveniens because it
did not satisfy the required factors. See id. However, the Court clearly stated that
if the United States possesses significant interest in the trial, the trial may be held
in U.S. federal court. See id. at 258-61. Consequently, the author assumes that
the hypothetical of a Belgium citizen suing the United States based on the Federal
Tort Claims Act provides the United States enough interest in the case to allow a
U.S. federal district court to hear it. The United States would have a significant
interest in our GPS hypothetical because unlike Piper, the United States would be
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While the GPS gives the world the capability to perform previously
unthinkable tasks, it has also opened the United States to
unparalleled liability.' 5
The GPS consists of three components: (1) a receiver on earth
that asks satellites in outer space to fix the receiver's location, (2)
the satellites that determine the longitude, latitude, and altitude
of that location, and (3) a manager that controls the system's
integrity.' 6 While private companies such as Rockwell Aerospace
and Orbital Services manufacture many of the satellites and
receivers used in the GPS, respectively, the United States is the
GPS's manager. 17
Consequently, negligent GPS management
could expose the United States to significant liability from people
8
around the globe.'
Persons suffering injury from a GPS miscalculation could
recover loss through one of four ways. First, the person could
recover through her respective country, which would seek redress
against the United States under international law. The United
States has liability under the United Nations since the United
States signed the 1972 Convention on International Liability for
Damage Caused by Space Objects. 19 Second, the citizen could
sue under the Foreign Claims Act (FCA).2 0 However, recovery
under the FCA does not allow a person to recover in a court of
law. It only allows the plaintiff to file an administrative claim
against a government agency. 2 '
Therefore, these first two
avenues of redress do not allow the wronged to personally pursue
the claim.
Nevertheless, the remaining possibilities do allow an injured
party to directly pursue the United States in court. As a third
option, a plaintiff could sue under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA).22
Finally, the plaintiff could sue under the Suits in
Admiralty Act (SAA). 2 3
Both of these acts waive sovereign

a party to the litigation.

See id.; see also Interview with Frank Bloch, Civil

Procedure Professor, Vanderbilt University, in Nashville, TN (Feb. 18, 1999).
15.
See infra Parts II & III.
16.
See LOGSDON, supra note 1, at 17-33.
17.
See id. at 145; Epstein, supra note 8, at 281. Rockwell Aerospace has
manufactured all 40 of the Block I and II Navstar satellites that have constructed
the GPS.
See LOGSDON, supra note 1, at 145. However, General Electric
Aerospace won the Defense contract to manufacture the 20 replacement Navstar
Block IIR satellites. See id.
18.
See infra Parts II & III.
19.
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389 [hereinafter Liability Convention].
20.
10 U.S.C. § 2734 (1994).
21.
See id.
22.
28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1994).
23.
46 U.S.C. § 741 (1994).
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immunity for the acts of government employees. 24 Since the SAA
is limited to torts committed in navigable waters controlled by the
United States, 25 much of the liability exposure of the United
States for negligent GPS operation would originate under the

FTCA.

26

While the FTCA waives sovereign immunity, it does not waive
U.S. immunity under all circumstances. 27
One of the more
significant and litigated exceptions to the FTCA is the
discretionary function exception. 28 The exception immunizes the
United States for
[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or
regulation whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or
based upon the exercise of or performance or the failure to exercise
or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the
29
discretion involved be abused.

Since the SAA lacks a discretionary function exception, some
plaintiffs have filed claims under the SAA when a tort occurs in
waters controlled by the United States.3 0
Nevertheless, U.S.
courts have read a discretionary function exception into the SAA
to prevent recovery that would ordinarily be barred had the tort
occurred on land instead of on water.3 ' Since a negligence suit
involving the discretionary function exception of the SAA does not
materially differ from the same lawsuit under the FTCA, this Note
32
will hereinafter refer to the FTCA for clarity.
This Note addresses the global liability of the United States
for negligent GPS operation under the FTCA with a focus on the

24.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680; 46 U.S.C. § 741.
25.
See 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752 (1994).
26.
See infra Part II.A. Although water covers a majority of the world's
surface, many of the GPS's uses involve activities based on land. See infra Part
II.A. Even if the alleged GPS negligence occurs on water, most courts have read a
FTCA "discretionary function" exception into the SAA. See Kathlynn G. Fadely,
Liability of the United Statesfor Negligent Charting,21 TORT & INS. L.J. 171, 18384 (1985) (recognizing which circuits imply a "discretionary function" exception in
the SAA); see also infra note 262 and accompanying text. Therefore, whether the
resulting injury occurs on land or water does not alter the FTCA's applicability to
this Note. See Fadeley, supra, at 183-84.
27.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1994) (listing the exceptions to the waiver of U.S.
liability).
28.
See Donald L. Zillman, Protecting Discretion: Judicial Interpretation of
the DiscretionaryFunctionException to the FederalTort ClaimsAct, 47 ME. L. REV.
366, 367 (1995) (analyzing over 100 cases involving the 'discretionary function"
exception of the FTCA); infra note 306 and accompanying text.
29.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1994).
30.
See Fadely, supranote 26, at 183-84.
31.
See id.
32.
See id.
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FTCA's discretionary function exception.3 3 Part II addresses the
expansion of the GPS from a military to a civilian tool and the
continued role of the United States in
providing GPS
information.3 4 Part III evaluates the availability of the FTCA to
civilians suffering harm outside of the United States. 35 Part IV
analyzes the development of the FTCA's discretionary function
exception through Supreme Court caselaw and an analysis of
U.S. Courts of Appeals caselaw.3 6 Part V assesses whether the
discretionary function exception will protect the United States
from liability for negligent GPS management.3 7 Finally, Part VI
concludes by recommending a course of action to protect the
United States from the unlimited worldwide liability generated by
38
its policy of providing GPS information free of charge.

II. EXPANSION OF THE GPS's CIVILIAN USE AND THE
CONTINUED ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN ITS
GLOBAL EVOLUTION
In one of the more dramatic displays of the U.S. military's
technological superiority in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, a Standoff
Land-Attack Missile (SLAM) blew a hole in the wall of an Iraqi
Power Plant.3 9 Two minutes later, a second SLAM flew through
the hole created by its predecessor.40
Signals from the then
partially complete GPS guided both of these SLAMs to their
targets. 4 1 In the early bombing raids against Germany in World
War II, only three percent of British bombs landed within five
miles of their intended targets. 4 2 What began as a vision of using
radio signals from satellites as a navigational tool during a 1973
Pentagon meeting has resulted in a weapon that provides the U.S.

33.
For a discussion of the liability of private defendants for negligentlymade Geographic Information Systems based on GPS data, see generally Jennifer
L. Phillips, Comment, Information Liability: The Possible Chilling Effect of Tort
Claims Against Producersof GeographicInformation Systems Data, 26 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 743 (1999).
34.
See infra Part II.
35.
See infra Part III.
36.
See infra Part IV.
37.
See infra Part V.
38.
See infra Part VI.
39.
See LOGSDON, supra note 1, at 208.
40.
See id.
41.
See id. The GPS did not reach Full Operational Capability until July
17, 1995, when all 24 NAVSTAR satellites went online. See Global Positioning
System Fully Operational, (July 17, 1995) (visited Jan. 22, 2000) <http://
206.65.196.30/gps/geninfo/global.htm>.
42.

See LOGSDON, supra note 1, at 208.
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4
military with capabilities few could have imagined in 1940. 3
Furthermore, this system has continued to enhance the
capabilities of the American military. The Tomahawk missile
gained fame in the Persian Gulf War by matching visual
landmarks to an inertial pre-programmed map to surgically
destroy military targets amidst civilian structures after flying over
1500 miles. 4 4 When President Clinton resumed airstrikes against
Saddam Hussein in 1998, an updated Tomahawk carrying a GPS
receiver improved the Tomahawk's legendary precision. 45 While
the U.S. government has extended the GPS's applicability to
additional military uses, people from across the globe have begun
exploring GPS civilian uses.

A. Extending the GPS to Civilian Use
In 1983, the Soviet Union shot down Korean Air Lines Flight
007 after the pilot accidentally strayed off course and violated
Soviet Union airspace. 46 Shortly thereafter, President Reagan
announced that the United States would grant civilians access to
GPS information. 4 7 Today the Department of Defense (DOD)
manages GPS for more than one million civilians that use the
GPS for a variety of purposes. 48
Included among the many
current GPS users are commercial ocean-going vessels that use
the positioning information for everything from navigation on the
49
open sea and in harbor to emergency locator beacons.
Furthermore, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has
begun constructing GPS landing systems that will eventually
replace the current Loran-C, Omega, and Instrument Landing
Systems (ILS) used by today's commercial airliners. 5 0

43.
See Sam Highley, GPS Use Expanding,AIR FORCE NEWS SERVICE, (visited
Feb. 20, 1999) <http://www.laafb.af.mil/SMC/CZ/homepage/resource/news/
afnews4.htm> (website no longer available, copy on file with author).
44.
See LOGSDON, supranote 1, at 219-20.
45.
See Andrea Stone, Strike is 'serious and sustained,' U.S.A. TODAY, Dec.
17, 1998, at A3. GPS can also enhance the precision of the hand-held weapons
used by U.S. light infantry and special forces' operators. See Advertisement for
Rockwell Collins Viper System, GPS WORLD, Mar. 1999, at 27. The Viper system
employs an optical GPS system that weighs only six and a half pounds. See id.
46.
See Soviet Attack on Korean Civilian Airliner, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 1266 (Sept. 16, 1983).
47.
See id.
48.
See Radionavigation Plan, supra note 5, at 3-3.
49.
See id at 3-4. For an entertaining account of a true story about a
commercial fishing vessel lost at sea in the North Atlantic's worst storm in over
100 years, see generally SEBASTIAN JUNGER, THE PERFECT STORM (1997). The New
York Times best-selling novel discusses current maritime radionavigation
techniques including the emergency radio beacon called an EPIRB (Emergency
Position Indicator Radio Beacon) that now employs a GPS receiver. See id.
50.
See Radionavigation Plan, supranote 5, at 3-2. A study by the Applied
Physics Laboratory (APL) at Johns Hopkins University concluded that GPS could
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However, GPS use is not limited to large-scale commercial
enterprises such as commercial fishing or aviation. In order to
construct the Chunnel,5 1 workers began digging from both ends
of the English Channel-Dover, England and Calais, France.5 2
Workers used GPS receivers to insure that the tunnel was not
only straight but that both sides would meet in the middle of the
English Channel.5 3 People have employed GPS technology,
moreover, in enterprises not even associated with navigation.
GPS receivers have been used by environmentalists to track
population patterns of Montana Elk and Mojave Desert
tortoises,5 4 miners to dig long-wall coal mines, the Coast Guard
to track hazardous icebergs, and explorers to discover famous
ships destroyed by icebergs. 5,
Despite the nearly endless list of applications for GPS
information, one of the fastest-growing segments of the GPS
market is land-based navigation.5 6 Car companies have already
begun interfacing GPS receivers with onboard maps located on a
vehicle's dashboard. 5 7 Furthermore, the Baltimore Mass Transit
Administration is improving its on-time record by equipping its
buses with GPS receivers so that the city's central dispatch can

successfully serve as the nation's sole radionavigation technique to land airplanes
once the FAA ceases operating its current systems. See Study Concludes GPS Can
Handle Sole-Means, GPS WORLD, Mar. 1999, at 18. But see Dee Ann Divis, WAAS:
Beleaguered,Bolstered, GPS WORLD, Mar. 1999, at 12-17 (criticizing the APL study
and summarizing the difficulties that the FAA has endured and must surpass to
successfully implement GPS as the FAA's only radionavigation tool).
51.
See The Aerospace Corporation, GPS Uses in Everyday Life, (visited
Jan. 28, 2000), <http://www.aero.org/publications/GPSPRIMER/EvryDyUse.
html>. The Chunnel is an underground tunnel that travels beneath the English
Channel. See id.
52.
See id.
53.
See id.
54.
See id.; see also William V. Mavros & Dennis D. Dauble, Redd Recon:
Mapping Chinook Spawning Habitat,GPS WORLD, Jan. 1999, at 28-35 (discussing
the use of GPS by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to study endangered species
of Pacific Northwest salmon).
55.
See LOGSDON, supra note 1, at 221-29. The ship in question is the
H.M.S. Titanic that was struck by a North Atlantic iceberg in 1912. See id.
56.
See id. A marketing study predicts that in 2004 95% of the Western
European market for GPS products will be in the land-based segment of GPS
products. See Frost & Sullivan, supranote 9, at 58.
57.
See Magellan Names New CEO, Signs Supplier Deal with Hertz, GPS
WORLD, Jan. 1999, at 18-19. In 1999, Orbital Science's Magellan division, a
leading manufacturer of GPS receivers, announced a $50 million joint venture
with the Hertz rental car agency to install GPS vehicle-navigation systems in the
company's rental cars. See id. The venture calls for Hertz to buy 50,000 systems.
See id. at 19. The joint venture will be a leader in setting worldwide pricing for
other vehicle-navigation systems. See id. The vehicle navigation system allows a
driver to access "voice and visual driving instructions, custom routing, road
exclusion to avoid undesirable streets, and off-road navigation with waypoints."
MagellanLaunches Auto System, GPS WORLD, Mar. 1999, at 64.
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more effectively reroute its buses.5 8 Meanwhile, Iowa, Minnesota,
and Wisconsin participated in a test project that used GPS
receivers to track the miles driven by cars to calculate fuel
taxes.5 9 With its ever-expanding popularity, GPS has become a
government tool that more civilians around the world depend on
for accurate information.
B. Precisionof the GPS
The GPS consists of two systems: Precise Positioning Service
(PPS) and Standard Positioning Service (SPS).6 0 PPS provides
accuracy to 22 meters horizontally and 27.7 meters vertically, but
it is only available to users that the DOD approves of, such as the
U.S. military. 6 ' Meanwhile, SPS is a PPS signal that the DOD
62
degrades and then provides to users worldwide free of charge.
SPS only provides horizontal accuracy to 100 meters and vertical
63
accuracy to 156 meters.
Even using the degraded SPS signal, GPS users receive
considerable
advantages
over
the
only
other
global
radionavigation technique currently in use-Omega. 64
The
Omega is one hundred times less accurate than GPS with a
positioning error of two to four nautical miles.6 5
Other
radionavigation techniques used by airplanes, such as the ILS
and Microwave Landing System (MLS), provide precision similar
to that of GPS, but these techniques exist within limited areas
66
such as the immediate vicinity of airports.
In spite of the SPS's superiority over the Omega system, the
government has begun augmenting the SPS signal to improve its
accuracy even more. Augmentation is the concept of receiving a
GPS SPS signal and then recalculating the signal's position by
using a known location on earth, for example, a nearby radio

58.
See Radionavigation Plan, supranote 5, at 4-12.
59.
See id.
60.
See Radionavigation Plan, supra note 5, at A-7.
61.
See id. The ranges possess a 95% accuracy rate. See id.
62.
See id. The degrading process by which the DOD degrades the PPS
signal is called Selective Availability (SA). See LOGSDON, supra note 1, at 307.
Beginning in 2000, the President will decide annually whether the DOD should
continue to use SA. See The White House: Office of Science and Technology Policy
and National Security Agency, U.S. Global Positioning System Policy (Mar. 29,
1996) <http://206.65.196.30/gps/geninfo/white.htm> (visited Jan. 22, 2000)
[hereinafter U.S. GPS Policy].
63.
See Radionavigation Plan, supra note 5, at A-7. The ranges posses a
95% accuracy rate. See id.
64.
See LOGSDON, supra note 1, at 36. The Omega uses eight very-lowfrequency transmitters that yield 88% coverage of the globe by day and 98% by
night. See id. The GPS provides global coverage 99.85% of the time. See id. at
17; Radionavigation Plan, supranote 5, at A-7.
65.
See LOGSDON, supra note 1, at 47.

66.

See id. at 48.
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beacon. 6 7 Since many of the radio beacons surround harbors,
the U.S. Coast Guard has been able to achieve this upgradereferred to as differential GPS (dGPS).68 With dGPS techniques,
the Coast Guard has achieved accuracy to ten meters
69
surrounding harbor approach and entrance areas.
Meanwhile, the standard SPS signal is not sufficient for the
FAA to use as the primary method of navigation for landing
airplanes. 70 Therefore, using augmentation similar to the Coast
Guard's dGPS, the FAA has implemented its own strategy to
improve GPS accuracy to the point that an airplane could perform
a Category III landing relying on GPS information. 7 1 Given the
increasing accuracy of augmented GPS, the DOD and the
Department of Transportation (DOT) will terminate or will have
begun to phase out all non-GPS navigation devices by the year
2006 leaving GPS as the lone navigational tool used by the United
States. 7 2 To expedite civilian GPS use, Vice President Gore
announced on March 30, 1998 that the United States would
provide a second civilian GPS channel. 73 The second channel

67.
See Gene W. Hall, USCG Differential GPS Navigation Service (Feb.
1996) (paper distributed by the U.S. Coast Guard Navigation Information Service
through Fax-on-Demand at (703) 313-5931, Doc. 207).
68.
See Radionavigation Plan, supra note 5, at 3-9 to 3-10. Differential
GPS also consists of using an integrity monitor to assess the health and validity of
a satellite and its signal. See Richard B. Langley, The Integrity of GPS, GPS
WORLD, Mar. 1999 at 60, 63. If the monitor detects an error, the system notifies
the GPS user within five seconds of detection. See id.
69.
See Radionavigation Plan, supra note 5, at 3-10.
70.
See id. at 3-9.
71.
See id. at 3-11 to 3-14. The two systems employed by the FAA are the
Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) and the Local Area Augmentation System
(LAAS). See id. WAAS recalibrates a GPS SPS signal with corrections by local
reference stations whose position are known on earth. See id. at 3-11. The WAAS
information is then relayed to the plane. See id. The LAAS comes into play when
an airplane is on approach and within the line of sight of a reference station. See
id. at 3-12. A Category III landing is a landing with extremely low visibility. See
LOGSDON, supranote 1, at 186. In order to use GPS for category III landings, the
FAA requires a horizontal accuracy of 4.1 meters and a vertical accuracy of 0.6
meters. See Langley, supra note 68, at 63. Furthermore, the probability of an
undetected system error for the LAAS cannot exceed 5 * 10-9. See id. LAAS can
meet these stringent requirements because LAAS gives airliners "centimeter-level
accuracy" along with "required degree of integrity" by using pseudolites--"Iowpower, ground based transmitters functioning as pseudo-GPS satellites." Id.
72.
See id. at 3-6.
73.
See Gore Announces, supra note 8, at 1-2. The Vice President also
announced $400 million to modernize the GPS. See Gore Announces Planfor GPS
Improvements, GPS WORLD, Mar. 1999, at 18 [hereinafter GPS Improvements].
Three hundred million dollars was slated for the DOD to prevent jamming to the
GPS and "alleviate DoD concerns about the additional open-signal availability to
potential enemies." Id. The sooner that the military can insure the system's
integrity from enemies, the sooner the United States can eliminate Selective
Availability. See id.; Langley, supra note 68, at 63. The remainder of the funds
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enhances the accuracy, robustness, and reliability of GPS by
allowing GPS receivers to more accurately correct for signal
distortion caused by the sun.74 Consequently, this new channel
gives civilians comparable access but still inferior accuracy
compared to that enjoyed by the U.S. military, which has always
possessed two GPS channels. 75
Furthermore, the U.S.
Interagency GPS Executive Board (IGEB) expects to add a third
GPS channel that will be used as a "safety-of-life" service signal in
the near future. 76
C. Expansion of the GPS to a Global Navigation
Satellite System (GNSS)
In March 1996, President Clinton provided a "strategic vision
for the future management and use of GPS, addressing a broad
range of military, civil, commercial, and scientific interests."7 7 As
part of his plan to create an international radionavigation
network, President Clinton directed the Department of State to
analyze potential agreements and to coordinate with foreign
countries and international organizations in preparation of a
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS).7 8 In specifying this

will be allocated to the DOT to improve the GPS through augmentation programs.
See GPS Improvements, supranote 73, at 18.
74.
See Gore Announces, supra note 8, at 1-2.
75.
See i. at 2.
76.
See id. President Clinton created the IGEB to manage and oversee the
GPS in 1996. See GPS Improvements, supra note 73, at 18; see also U.S. GPS
Policy, supranote 63.
77.
U.S. GPS Policy, supranote 63, at 2.
78.
See id. The history of the GNSS has been confusing while its future
remains even more uncertain. The European Union proposed the first GNSS,
known as GNSS-1. See Dee Ann Divis, Continental Shft Changing Strategies on
GNSS Chess Match, GPS WoRLD, Jan. 1999, at 14. The European Union intended
GNSS-1 to be a combination of the U.S. GPS and augmentation systems, the
European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS), and Japan's
Multifunctional Transport Satellite (MTSAT) and its Satellite-Based Augmentation
System (MSAS). See id. However, the European Union changed its thinking and
has now proposed a second GNSS-GNSS-2. See id. Instead of working with the
Americans, GNSS-2 is an attempt by the European Union to produce a competing
rival to the established GPS of the United States. See id. The GNSS-2 would
probably utilize the Soviet Union's attempt at a global radionavigation toolGLONASS-as a starting point. See id. Currently, the incomplete GLONASS
system only contains twelve functional satellites. See id.
While the United States expects its GPS to compete with the EU's GNSS-2, the
United States has considered working with the European Union in order to insure
that the GPS and GNSS-2 would be compatible. See id. at 14-16. The United
States changed its policy largely due to a firm commitment of $550 million by the
European Union to the GNSS-2. See id. Despite its financial backing, the GNSS-2
is still many years away from completion. See id. at 14-17. One of the GNSS-2's
largest obstacles is establishing a manager for the system analogous to the U.S.
military's role in the GPS.
See id.
Furthermore, the European Union has
expressed its desire to make the GNSS-2 profitable. See id. This is a daunting
task given that the GPS's SPS is operated free of charge and "will remain so for the
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broad directive, the Federal Radionavigation Plan noted that the
FAA has cooperated with the Russian Federation to study the
benefits of combining the GPS with the former Soviet satellite
navigation system called GLONASS. 79 By combining the satellites
of the two systems, a GNSS could offer advancements in polar
coverage, resistance to jamming, and accuracy. 8 0
Recognizing the need of the United States to maintain its lead
and influence in the development of satellite-based navigation,
the U.S. Congress passed the Commercial Space Act of 1998 on
October 28, 1998.81 The Act promotes U.S. GPS standards and
the maintenance of the GPS free of user costs.8 2

Furthermore,

the Act encourages the President to "eliminate any foreign
barriers to applications of the Global Positioning System
worldwide" and to enter into international agreements with
foreign governments that will expand the U.S. role in the space
83
radionavigation market.
D. Management by the United States
Regardless of the future shape of the GPS or the GNSS, the
United States is expected to play a key role in the control segment
of any space radionavigation technique.8 4 While the United States
has expanded GPS access and civilians have begun to rely on the
service more extensively, the DOD still provides GPS information
to anyone in the world for no cost.85 The U.S. involvement with
the management of GPS consists of three segments. 8 6 First, the
Operational Control Segment consists of the Master Control
Station (MCS) located at Schriver Air Force Base in Colorado
Springs, Colorado.8 7 Operated twenty-four hours a day, seven

foreseeable future." Id. at 17.
Given the political, financial, and technical
challenges facing the GNSS-2, its ultimate shape and the role of the United States
in it still remain very much in doubt.
See id.
However, the European
Commissioners (EC) have pressed the EU Parliament to make a decision on the
GNSS-2 before the United States launches its new array of GPS satellites, which
will bolster the constellation and thus establish the GPS as the radionavigation
standard and relegate the European Union to a role-player.
See European
Commission Urges GNSS Support, GPS WORLD, Mar. 1999, at 18.
79.
See Radionavigation Plan, supranote 5, at 3-24.
See id.
80.
81.
42 U.S.C.A. § 14701 (1999).
82.
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 14712(b) (1999).
83.
Id.
84.
See id.
85.

See id.

86.
See Navstar Global PositioningSystem Joint Program Office (visited Jan.
22, 2000) <http://gps.losangeles.af.mil/index.html> [hereinafter Navstar Global
PositioningSystem].

87.

See id. For a unique inside look at the Master Control Station and a

detailed analysis of the GPS, see Chris Shank & John W. Lavrakas, Inside GPS:
The Master Control Station, GPS WORLD, Sept. 1994, at 46-54. At the time of
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days a week by Air Force Space Command, the MCS calculates
ephemeris orbital and clock data and uploads this data to each
satellite in the GPS constellation."8 Without this data, the GPS
would not work because the satellites would not know their
precise position in space.8 9 Second, monitor stations located at
the MCS, Hawaii, Kwajalein, Diego Garcia, and Ascension serve
as listening posts to gather the raw pseudorange data required by
the MCS to calculate the ephemeris orbital data relayed to the
satellites. 90 Third, Ground Antennas controlled by the MCS-but
located at Kwajalein, Diego Garcia, and Ascension-enable the
91
MCS to control the satellites.
E. U.S. Exposure to Liability
The source of U.S. liability exposure from civilians will most
likely emanate from an error resulting from the operation of the
MCS, the Monitor Stations, the Ground Antennas, or a
combination thereof. For example, in October 1992, the MCS
uploaded an ephemeris orbital error to a satellite that caused a
horizontal position error to GPS receivers that exceeded three
hundred meters. 92 If an experimental mass transit system called
"platooning" or if surveyors building the world's next skyscraper
received an error similar to the one in 1992, the error would
cause the cars to crash or the building to be built in the wrong
location. Thus, such an error could incur physical or economic
loss. 93 The world's increased dependence on accurate GPS
operation, combined with the history of the 1992 error, highlight
the possibility of another GPS miscalculation. 94 If such an error

publication, co-author Shank was a first lieutenant and satellite navigation
analyst with the 2nd Space Operations Squadron, which is responsible for the
MCS.
88.
See id. at 48. 'Constellation" in the context of the GPS refers to the
spatial arrangement of the 24 Navstar satellites that create the GPS and provide
worldwide coverage 24 hours a day. See Navstar Global PositioningSystem, supra
note 86.
89.
See discussion supranote 7.
90.
See Navstar Global Positioning System, supra note 86. Hawaii and
Kwajalein are in the Pacific Ocean. See GPS Primer, Ground Control Stations and
Receivers (visited Feb. 1, 2000) <http://www.aero.org/publications/GPSPRIMER/
GmdCntrlRecvrs.html>. Diego Garcia is in the Indian Ocean. See id. Ascension
Island is in the Atlantic Ocean. See id.; Shank & Lavrakas, supranote 87, at 48.
91.
See Navstar Global Positioning System, supra note 86. In the event of
failure by the Ground Antennas, the pre-launch compatibility station located in
Cape Canaveral, Florida can be used as a backup. See id.
92.
See Alsip, supra note 12, at 1-2.
93.
See LOGSDON, supra note 1, at 270. "Platooning" is a name for a
futuristic traffic pattern where GPS-reiant and computer-controlled cars travel at
highway speeds with only four feet separating them. See id. Consequently, more
cars can travel on the same highway given the lack of space between the
platooning cars. See id.
94.
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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occurs again, a plaintiff suffering harm from a GPS error could
file a negligence claim under the FTCA in federal court.9 5 Since
the United States should argue immunization because it has
performed a discretionary function, the FTCA caselaw deserves

analysis.

96

III. APPLICABILITY OF THE FTCA TO TORTS OCCURRING
OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

Before analyzing the FTCA's discretionary function exception,
it is first necessary to defie the jurisdictional applicability of the
FTCA. The FTCA states that it does not apply to "any claim
arising in a foreign country" (foreign country exception).9 7 The
international applicability of the FTCA in a GPS context would
most likely stem from an upload error to a satellite by the MCS in
Colorado that causes harm somewhere outside the United
States. 98 Since the GPS and its likely successor, the GNSS, are

truly global services, it is highly likely that an upload error will
affect a non-U.S. citizen using GPS information outside the
United States. It appears from the FTCA's language that the
United States is immune from suit in U.S. federal court for any
GPS-reliant damage occurring outside its borders.
However, courts have focused on where the claim "arises"99
and not the location of damage to determine the FTCA's
applicability. In United States v. Spelar, an airplane crashed on
approach at U.S-operated Harmon Field in Newfoundland.10 0 The

95.
See infra Part I.
96.
See infra Part I.
97.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1994).
98.
See discussion infra Parts I & II.E. Obviously, the FTCA would only
apply if the plaintiff sued the United States in federal district court. See id.
99.
In other words, "arises" refers to the place where the allegedly negligent
act occurred.
100.
338 U.S. 217, 218-19 (1949).
For other cases barring torts on
American embassies or military bases located in foreign countries under the
FTCA's foreign country exception, see Eaglin v. United States, 794 F.2d 981, 983
(5th Cir. 1986); Broadnax v. United States, 710 F.2d 865, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1983);
Meredith v. United States, 330 F.2d 9, 11 (9th Cir. 1964). In Burna v. United
States, an FTCA foreign country exception case in post-World War II Japan, the
Court stated that Okinawa was still a foreign country within the meaning of the
FTCA. See 240 F.2d 720, 721 (4th Cir. 1957). Similarly, in Cobb v. United States,
the Ninth Circuit concluded that Japanese tort law would be applicable to a tort
occurring in Oldnawa. See 191 F.2d 604, 611 (9th Cir. 1951). The court noted
that Okinawa was a foreign country because the U.S. Military government was not
free to alter the tort law of Okinawa but instead was bound to maintain the
preexisting "foreign law." See id. "Since Congress was unwilling to subject the
United States to liability based on that sort of law, the action was properly
dismissed." Id.; see also Heller v. United States, 776 F.2d 92, 96 (3d Cir. 1985).
In Heller v. United States, a United States Air Force serviceman brought suit
against United States and others to recover compensatory and punitive damages
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estate of a decedent in the crash alleged that the United States
negligently operated the field.' 0 ' In order to decide whether the
FTCA barred the action, the Supreme Court looked to the
legislative history of the FTCA.' 0 2 After examining the legislative
record, the Court concluded that Congress passed the FTCA's
foreign country exception to guarantee that the United States
would not be subject to the "laws of a foreign power."' 0 3 Since
the accident and the base where the alleged negligence occurred
were in Newfoundland, the Court concluded that the site of the
negligence was Newfoundland and not the United States.' 0 4 The
foreign country exception, therefore, barred the suit.'0 5
In a subsequent case that decided which U.S. state law to
apply to a FTCA claim, the Supreme Court further clarified the
FTCA's foreign country exception.

In Richards v. United States,

for the wrongful death of his wife after treatment at a military hospital in the
Republic of the Philippines. See Heler, 776 F.2d at 96. The court stated that the
foreign country exception applies if (1) the tort occurs in a jurisdiction outside of
U.S. sovereignty, and (2) the United States is subject to liability based upon the
foreign law. See id. The court also noted that if the United States exercises
jurisdiction over its nationals in foreign countries, foreign sovereignty by definition
can still exist. See id. The court stated
It is uncontrovertible that nations, even though they are recognized as fuli
members of the international community, must modify their internal
affairs as a result of their participation in the international community,
often in accord with treaty obligations. Thus it is reasonable that torts
occurring on American military bases are barred by the foreign country
exception, despite the fact that the enforcement authority on base is
American.
Id.
101.
See United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 218 (1949).
102.
See id. at 219. The Court cited the following interchange to prove that
the location of the act determines whether the FTCA applies:
Assistant Attorney General Francis M. Shea: Claims arising in a foreign
country have been exempted from this bill, H.R. 6463, whether or not the
claimant is an alien. Since liability is to be determined by the law of the
situs of the wrongful act or omission it is wise to restrict the bill to claims
arising in this country. This seems desirable because the law of the
particular State is being applied. Otherwise, it will lead I think to a good
deal of difficulty.
[Congressman] Mr. Robison [of the House Judiciary Committee]: You
mean by that any representative of the United States who committed a tort
in England or some other country could not be reached under this?
Mr. Shea: That is right. That would have to come to the Committee on
Claims in Congress.
Id. at 221
35, 66.)
103.
104.
105.

(quoting Hearings H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, 77th Cong. 2d Sess., at 29,
Id. at 221.
See id. at 221-22.
See id. at 222.
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an American Airlines' airplane crashed in Missouri en route from
Tulsa, Oklahoma to New York City.' 0 6
The plaintiffs,
representatives of the decedent passengers, argued that the
United States was liable under the FTCA for allowing the airline's
negligent overhaul of the plane before it left Tulsa.1 0 7 The Court
held that FTCA claims applied the law of the state where the "acts
of negligence took place," not where the negligence had its
"operative" effect.' 0 8 Thus, the law of the site of the plane's
overhaul, Oklahoma, and not the site of its crash, Missouri,
controlled the FTCA claim. ' 0 9
Meanwhile, the Courts of Appeals have followed the Supreme
Court's lead by defining the FTCA's foreign country exception as
the situs of the negligent act and not the locus of the injury. In In
re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, a Douglas DC-10 airplane
operated by Turkish Airlines crashed shortly after takeoff in Paris,
France killing all 346 people on board. 1 10 The plaintiffs alleged
that the United States was liable because the FAA failed to certify,
inspect, and require that structural changes be made to the
airplane."'
Citing the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
state conflict of law issue in Richards, the court held that where
the tort arises and not the location of injury determines the
applicability of the FTCA." 2 Because the allegations for negligent
inspection occurred in the state of California in In re Paris Air
Crash, the court ruled that the suit could proceed under federal
and California law.113
Similarly, in Sami v. United States, an Afghanistan citizen
sued the United States for an improper extradition request sent
from Florida to the International Criminal Police Organization
(Interpol).1 14 Because German authorities improperly detained
the plaintiff, he sued the United States for false arrest,
defamation, and a deprivation of his constitutional rights."15

106.
107.

369 U.S. 1, 3 (1962).
See id. at 3. This violated a regulation of the Civil Aeronautics Act. See

id.
108. Id. at 10.
109.
See id.
110.
See 399 F. Supp. 732, 735-36 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
111.
See id. at 737.
112.
See id.; see also Richards,369 U.S. at 3-10.
113.
See 399 F. Supp. at 749; see also Leaf v. United States, 588 F.2d 733,
736 (9th Cir. 1978) (precluding summary judgment on Section 2680(k) because
allegations of Drug Enforcement Agency impropriety transpired in Arizona and
California even though suit arose out of a crash in Mexico); Manemann v. United
States, 381 F.2d 704, 705 (10th Cir. 1967) (holding that when negligent acts in
Taiwan led to injury in the United States, the claim arose in a foreign country for
purposes of determining the relevance of § 2680(k)).
114. 617 F.2d 755, 757 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
115. See id. Interpol held him for four days. See id. at 758.
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Citing the legislative history of the FTCA's foreign country
provision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
stated that the "[foreign country exception to the FTCA] does not
apply if the wrongful acts or omissions complained of occur in the
United States."1 1 6 Because the Broward County Sheriffs office in
Florida committed the negligent act that proximately caused the
plaintiffs false detention in Germany, the D.C. Circuit overturned
the District Court by holding that the plaintiffs suit could
7
proceed under the FTCA."
Furthermore, courts have extended the FTCA to cover alleged
negligent government decisions made in the United States but
carried out entirely in a foreign country. In In re 'Agent Orange"
Product Liability Litigation, Vietnam veterans and their families
sued the chemical companies that manufactured the biological
weapon Agent Orange. 11 8 Consequently, the chemical companies
impleaded the United States for its decision to use Agent Orange
in the Vietnam War." 9 Noting that Congress intended that the
foreign country exception protect the United States from the laws
of a foreign power, the court ruled that the decision to use the
chemical was made in the United States. 120 Writing for the court,
Chief Judge Jack Weinstein stated that "under the FTCA, a tort
claim 'arises' at the place where the negligent act or omission
occurred and not where the injury occurred." 12 1 Thus, the
plaintiffs could proceed with their suit, and the foreign country
22
exception of the FTCA did not bar the claim.1
Given the aforementioned caselaw, it seems clear that the
site of the negligent act instead of the location of the resulting

116.

Id. at 762.

117.
See id. at 761-63; see also Orlikow v. United States, 682 F. Supp. 77,
85-87 (D.D.C. 1988) (holding that the alleged negligence against the CIA for
supervising employees and funding medical malpractice and research experiments
on unwitting human subjects in Canada did not "arise in a foreign country" and
therefore that the suit was not barred by the FTCA's foreign country exception).
But see Cominotto v. United States, 802 F.2d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1986). In
Cominotto v. United States, plaintiff, who had been asked to assist in a Thailand
undercover operation, was shot in the course of the operation. See 802 F.2d at
1130. He brought suit against the United States under the FTCA. See id. The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that the impact of U.S. Secret
Service activities in the United States on the Thailand operation was too
attenuated to support a "headquarters" claim under the FTCA. See id. "Such
claims typically involve allegations of negligent guidance in an office within the
United States of employees who cause damage while in a foreign country, or of
activities which take place within a foreign country." Id. Thus the foreign country
exception of the FTCA barred the lawsuit. Id.
118.
580 F. Supp. 1242, 1244 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
119.
See id.
120.
See id. at 1254-55.
121.
Id. at 1254.
122.
See id. at 1255.
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damage determines the foreign country exception's applicability.
Consequently, one commentator, Kevin K. Spradling, has argued
that a civilian in Norway relying on faulty GPS information caused
by a negligent data upload at the MCS in Colorado could sue the
United States under the FTCA. 123 The result seems correct given
the well-established precedent on the issue, unless a court views
the negligent act leading to the damage in Norway as "arising" in
outer space instead of in Colorado. Spradling addressed this
concern but concluded that since outer space, similar to
Antarctica, has no government, the FTCA's exception for claims
arising in a foreign country could not apply. 12 4 Thus, even if a
court ruled that the negligent act occurred in government-less
outer space, the foreign country exception would not bar a FTCA
claim. 125 At the time Spradling's article was published in 1990,
this result made sense since the Supreme Court interpreted the
words "foreign country" in the FTCA to mean "territory subject to
126
the sovereignty of another nation."
In 1993, the Supreme Court decided Smith v. United States, a
case in which the spouse of a carpenter, who died by walking into
a crevasse in Antarctica, sued the United States for failing to
mark the crevasse. 12 7 Even though Antarctica possesses no
recognized government, the Supreme Court held that it is a
"foreign country" within the scope of the FTCA. 128 Therefore, the
Court dismissed the suit because the claim arose in a foreign
country, and the foreign country exception bars suits arising in a
2 9
foreign country.1
Smith complicates the issue of the FTCA's applicability to
torts arising from negligent GPS operation. The Outer Space
Treaty of 1967 establishes that outer space will be operated on "a
basis of equality and in accordance with international law."' 30
Similar to Antarctica, which is also governed by international law,

123.
See Kevin K. Spradling, The InternationalLiability Ramifications of the
U.S.' NAVSTAR Global Positioning System, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-THIRD
COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 93 (1990).

At the publication of his

paper, Kevin K. Spradling was a Major in the United States Air Force and Director
of Space and International Law for the U.S. Air Force Space Command. See id.
124.
See id. at 96.
125.
See id.
126. United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 219 (1949); see Spradling, supra
note 123, at 96.
127.
507 U.S. 197, 199 (1993).
128.
Id. at 204-05.
129.
See id. Smith overturned Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
130.
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, opened for signatureJan. 27, 1967, art. I, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S.
205.
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outer space could be deemed as falling under the foreign country
exception of the FTCA.13 ' However, a court must first rule that
the alleged negligent act by a U.S. government employee occurred
in outer space. While a negligent upload from the MCS in
Colorado would pass through a Navstar satellite orbiting in outer
space, the actual human negligence would have to occur on earth
and within the United States. 13 2 Therefore, the foreign country
exception should not limit the jurisdiction of the FTCA, but it is a
concern that would be raised in a claim against the United States
for negligent GPS management. Nevertheless, the foreign country
exception is not the only barrier that the FTCA would pose to a
suit against the United States for negligently operating the GPS.
IV.

INTERPRETATION OF THE

FTCA's

DISCRETIONARY

FUNCTION EXCEPTION

In order to find liability under the FTCA, a plaintiff must also
prove that the FTCA's discretionary function exception does not
apply. 133 This section will determine how courts interpret
Congress' language that the FTCA does not apply to acts "based
upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the
discretion involved be abused. " 13 While this Note previously
illustrated how the foreign country exception can limit the
exposure of the United States to suits, it is the above-mentioned
discretionary function that is the most often litigated and about
the most common bar to FTCA suits against the United States.' 3 5
Consequently, an informed discussion of the exception's
applicability to a suit for GPS operation requires a thorough,
albeit lengthy, analysis of the exception's evolution through
relevant caselaw. Thus, this section of the Note will address both
Supreme Court and U.S. Courts of Appeals law interpreting the
discretionary function exception.' 3 6 However, it does not perform
a comprehensive survey of all discretionary function caselaw, but
instead only analyzes cases that would be pertinent in light of a
lawsuit against the United States for negligently operating the
GPS.1'

7

131.
See Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
132.
See supraPart II.E.; see infra notes 324-27 and accompanying text.
133.
See supranotes 27-29 and accompanying text.
134.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1994).
135.
See supra note 28 and accompanying text; infra Part IV.B.5 and note
306 and accompanying text.
136.
See infra Part IV.
137.
See infra Part IV; supranotes 12-15; infra note 221.
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U.S. Supreme Court Caselaw

In its first opportunity to tackle the discretionary function
exception of the FTCA, the Supreme Court created the
"government nature or function" test. In Dalehite v. United States,
approximately 300 separate plaintiffs consolidated against the
United States under the FTCA for negligence. 138 The claims arose
from an explosion in Texas Harbor caused by Fertilizer Grade
Ammonium Nitrate (FGAN). 13 9 One cargo ship carried FGAN and
a cargo of explosives; meanwhile, another ship carried FGAN and
two thousand pounds of sulfur.14 °
After the ship with the
explosives caught fire, both ships, located in Texas Harbor,
exploded killing many people and leveling most of the city. 14 1 The
plaintiffs sued the United States for negligent storage and
transportation of FGAN under the FTCA. 14 2
The lower court recognized that Congress' intent in the FTCA
was to waive government immunity for its employees' tortious
conduct."4
However, the Supreme Court noted that Congress
did not "[contemplate] that the Government should be subject to
liability arising from acts of a governmental nature or
function." 1 " The Court relied on the fact that Congress intended
to protect the government from acts affecting "governmental
functions." 145 The FTCA intended to allow liability for tortious
acts, such as car-wrecks, committed by government employees
but not those acts undertaken with discretion. 146 Consequently,
the discretionary function exception was to cover those acts with
"room for policy judgment and decision." 147
Furthermore, the
Court did not differentiate between decisions made by
subordinates
and
those
made
by
executive-level
8
administrators. 14

138. 346 U.S. 15, 17 (1953).
139. See id. at 18. FGAN's primary ingredient is ammonium nitrate, a
compound with a high free nitrogen content and popular part of many explosives.
See id at 21. The government's interest in FGAN began with the Tennessee Valley
Authority's (TVA) statutory-imposed requirement to manufacture fertilizer. See i&.
at 18. Following World War II, the United States agreed to assist in the feeding of
the Axis powers. See id. at 19-20. After storing 1850 tons of FGAN in Texas City,
the United States loaded the chemical in two cargo ships docked in Texas Harbor.
See i&. at 22. Therefore, the FGAN sat on the dock awaiting export to Germany,
Japan, and Korea. See id. at 17-20.
140.
See id. at 22-23.
141.
See id. at 23.
142.
See id.
143.
See id.
144. Id. at 28.
145. Id. at 32.
146. See id. at 34.
147. Id. at 36.
148. See id. at 36.

2000]

GPS LIABILITY UNDER THE FTCA

The Court singled out five discretionary acts in the storage of
the FGAN that immunized the government from liability. 14 9 One
act included the executive decision by the United States to
produce and transport FGAN.' 5 o Meanwhile, the government
performed four discretionary acts at Texas Harbor. 15 1 They
included the temperature of the stored FGAN, the type of
container, the type of labeling, and the decision to employ
paraffim coating on the containers.' 5 2 The Court summarized its
findings by stating that the decisions leading to the government's
alleged liability transpired at the planning level of the fertilizer
program instead of at its operational level.' 5 3 Therefore, the Court
held that the government's acts, regardless of their alleged
negligence, were discretionary acts, and the plaintiffs could not
sue the government under the FTCA because the discretionary
154
function exception barred the claims.
The Supreme Court later narrowed its interpretation of the
discretionary function from the broad policy-oriented government
function test by focusing on the difference between planning and
operational levels of government action. In Indian Towing Co. v.
United States, a tugboat owner sued the United States after a
malfunctioning lighthouse supposedly caused the barge that the
tugboat was towing to run aground.' 5s The plaintiff alleged that
faulty maintenance and lack of a warning due to the lighthouse's
malfunction caused the barge to run aground.' 5 6
The
government claimed immunity because the operation of a
lighthouse was a "uniquely governmental function."' 5 7 The Court
did not agree with the government's argument, however, because
the logical conclusion of accepting this interpretation would
undermine the FTCA's purpose by giving the government near
blanket immunity.' 5 8 Consequently, the Court stated that these
allegations fell into the operational aspect of government

149.
See id. at 39-40.
150.
See id.
151.
See id.
152.
See id.
153.
See id. at 42.
154.
See iU. at 42-43.
155.
350 U.S. 61, 61-62 (1955).
156.
See id. at 62. The plaintiffs alleged three specific acts of negligence: (1)
the failure to check the lighthouse's battery and sun relay system, (2) the failure
to insure the connections exposed to the elements were properly aligned, and (3)
the failure to repair the light or to issue a proper warning to mariners. See id.
157.
Id. at 64-65. The government arrived at its argument by asserting that
reading § 2674 and § 2680(a) of the FTCA led to protection for of all "uniquely
governmental functions." Id.
158.
See id. at 67. "[AII Government activity is inescapably 'uniquely
governmental' in that it is performed by the Government." Id.
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While the Coast Guard's decision to provide a

lighthouse was a planning decision, its continued maintenance of
the lighthouse was an operational decision that did not involve
discretionary activity. 6 0° Thus, the Court held that the tugboat
16 1
owner could proceed under the FTCA.
Without overruling the planning/operational distinction, the
Supreme Court later interpreted the discretionary function
exception to protect only those government actions within the
"nature and scope" of the FTCA. In United States v. Varig Airlines,
the Court consolidated two claims against the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA). 16 2 One claim emanated from a fire that
eventually killed 124 people aboard a Varig Airlines' Rio de
Janeiro-to-Paris flight.' 6 3 The plaintiffs alleged that the FAA was
liable for the fire because it certified the plane as meeting FAA
requirements when it did not. 16 4 The second claim arose from a
fire in the luggage compartment of a different airplane when the
FAA negligently certified a cabin heater that did not conform to its
requirements. 165
Recognizing the definitional problems inherent in the
discretionary function exception, the Court employed two factors
to consider and interpret when deciding whether the discretionary
function exception applies. 166 First, the Court stated that the
"nature of the conduct, rather than the status of actor"

159. See id. at 64. The history of the operational distinction originated in
Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 42 (1953).
160. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 69 (1955). The
Court also referred to traditional "hornbook law" that states that once one has
undertaken the duty of warning the public about a public danger, the task must
be performed in a careful manner. See id. at 64-65.
161. See id. at 69.
Indian Towing is a confusing case under the
discretionary function exception. The government conceded that the discretionary
function exception of § 2680(a) of the FTCA did not directly apply. See id. at 64.
However, the government argued that it was nonetheless protected because
§ 2674 of the FTCA (imposing liability "in the same manner and to the same extent
as a private individual under like circumstances") implicated § 2680(a) and thus
immunized the government for unique government functions.
See id.
Nevertheless, the Court held the United States liable under the "Good Samaritan"
doctrine of state tort law while stating that the FTCA did not bar the claim. See id.
at 64-65. Later in United States v. Gaubert, the Supreme Court clarified Indian
Towing by holding that operational level decisions could receive the protection of
the discretionary function exception. See United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315,
326 (1991).
162. 467 U.S. 797, 799-803 (1984).
163. See id. at 799-800.
Federal regulations at the time, 14 C.F.R.
§ 4b.381(d) (1956), required that "waste receptacles be made of fire-resistant
materials and incorporate covers or other provisions for containing possible fires."
Id. at 801. The fire started from a non-fire retardant trash container in the Boeing
707's lavatory that did not satisfy FAA regulations. See id. at 800-01.
164. Seeid.at801.
165. See id. at 802-03.
166. See United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 813 (1984).
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16 7
determines the discretionary function exception's applicability.
This factor originated from the Court's decision in Dalehite that
emphasized all employees, not just high-level government
168
employees, fall under the discretionary function exception.
Second, the Court held that Congress intended the exception to
protect "discretionary acts of the Government acting in its role as
a regulator of the conduct of private individuals." 16 9 The Court
reasoned that Congress desired to immunize the government as
regulatorfrom civil liability since the original version of the FTCA
specifically mentioned two regulatory agencies.' 70 This desire
emanated from Congress' purpose of preventing the judicial
second-guessing of a regulatory agency's "political, social, and
17 1
economic judgments."
Applying its revised discretionary function standard to the
two claims, the Court held that the exception protected the
In both situations, the FAA
United States from liability.17 2
enforced its regulations not by uniform inspections of all
airplanes but through spot-checks.' 73 Noting the existence of
fewer than four hundred FAA engineers, the Court concluded that
the FAA must make policy decisions that were of a "nature and
quality" that the discretionary function exception intended to
the FAA's
Consequently,
from liability.17 4
immunize
"discretionary" decisions were its policy judgments "regarding the
degree of confidence that might reasonably be placed in a given
manufacturer, the need to maximize compliance with FAA
175
regulations, and the efficient allocation of agency resources."
A court's review of these decisions would in effect be "secondguessing" the FAA. 176 Thus, the plaintiffs could not proceed with
77
their suit under the FTCA.1

167. Id.
See id.
168.
169.
Id. at 813-14.
170.
See id. at 814.
171.
Id. at 820.
See id. at 821.
172.
173.
See id. at 815. By employing spot-checks, the FAA has effectively
placed the burden of safety on the manufacturers. See id. Federal regulations at
that time, 14 CFR § 21.17 (1983), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1421(b), 1425(a), placed the
burden of meeting FAA requirements on the applicant for certification-the
manufacturer (original certification) or the carrier (when a change has been made).
See id. at 815-17. The relevant procedures for a spot-check at the time of the
accident were outlined in the CAA Manual of Procedure § .330. See id. at 818.
Id. at 807, 819.
174.
175.
Id. at 820.
176.
Id.
177.
See id. at 821.
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Varig's protection of regulatory agencies' decisions created
confusion among the U.S. Courts of Appeals. 178 Therefore, in
Berkovitz v. United States, the Supreme Court extended Varig by
creating a simpler two-pronged test to determine if the
discretionary
function
exception protects a
government
decision. 17 9 Berkovitz clarified Varig by concluding that the
discretionary function exception does not immunize all actions of
a regulatory agency but only those acts of a regulatory agency
that involve judgment. 8 0° Hence, the first prong of the analysis

requires that the challenged conduct involve choice by the
government employee. 1 8 1 If the first prong has been satisfied, the
second prong requires a court to determine whether the
employee's choice was of the kind that Congress intended to
protect. 18 2 The Court invoked Vaig's language to explain that
Congress desired to "prevent judicial 'second guessing' of
legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social,
economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in
tort."1 8 3 Thus, a decision invoking broad public policy judgment
would receive the protection of the discretionary function
84
exception.'
In Berkovitz, an infant became paralyzed after contracting
polio from a specific polio vaccine dose that the National Institute
of Health (NIH) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had
negligently approved and licensed.' 85 The infant's family sued

178.
Compare Berkovitz v. United States, 822 F.2d 1322, 1329-32 (3d Cir.
1987) (holding that the discretionary function exception bars a negligence action
against the FDA's licensing of a polio vaccine), with Baker v. United States, 817
F.2d 560, 564-66 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that the discretionary function
exception does not bar a negligence action against the FDA's licensing of a polio
vaccine).
179.
Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988). CompareAmy M.
Hackman, Note, The DiscretionaryFunction Exception to the Federal Tort Claims
Act: How Much is Enough? 19 CAMPBELL L. REv. 411, 420-21 (1997) (arguing that
the Court created the two-pronged test in Varig), with Zillman, supra note 28, at
370-71 (arguing that the Court created the two-pronged test in Berkovitz).
180.
See Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 538. In the Third Circuit and the instant
case, the United States argued that Varig stood for the proposition that all actions
of a federal regulatory agency were immune from liability under the FTCA. See id.
However, the Court stated that the FTCA's text proved dispositive, as the
exception protected "discretionary" functions, rather than "regulatory" functions.
Id.
181.
See id. at 536. In creating the first prong, the Court relied on the text
of the exception. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1994).
182.
See Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536.
183.
Id. at 536-37.
184.
See id.
185.
See id. at 533. The two-month old received the vaccine, Orimune. See
id. The Bureau of Biologics of the FDA along with the Division of Biologic
Standards (DBS) of the NIH approved the vaccine manufactured by Lederle
Laboratories. See id. The Court judged both actions, the negligent approval and
the initial licensing, under a motion to dismiss. See id. at 533-34.
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the NIH and the FDA for two actions-the negligent approval of
186
the vaccine and the negligent licensing of the vaccine.
Regarding the negligent approval of the vaccine, the Court
applied the first prong and asked whether the decisionmaker of
the alleged negligent conduct had the ability to use his or her
judgment.1 8 7
The Court stated that federal regulations
establishing a process that leaves no room for judgment do not
fall under the discretionary function exception.' 8 8
The
regulations in Berkovitz did not leave room for NIH and FDA
officials to have "knowingly approved" a vaccine that violated its
own safety standards. 189 Consequently, the Court held that the
complaint was "directed at a governmental action that allegedly
involved no policy discretion."' 90 The Court distinguished the
instant case from Varig, in which the FAA's "spot-checking"
inspection plan necessarily involved policy judgment by the FAA
inspectors.' 9 1 Thus, the discretionary function exception did not
bar the negligent approval suit in Berkovitz because the first
prong was not satisfied. 19 2 If the first prong is not satisfied, a
193
court need not address the second prong.
However, the Court could not ultimately resolve the issue of
whether the discretionary function exception protected the
government's licensing of the vaccine's production.' 9 4 The Court
attempted to finalize the issue by splitting the plaintiffs negligent
licensing claim into two components.' 95 First, if the plaintiff was
alleging that the NIH licensed the vaccine without testing whether
it conformed to statutory guidelines, then the discretionary
function exception does not immunize the government. 19 6 In this
scenario, the suit could proceed because a decision that violates a
"specific mandatory directive" involves no discretion. 19 7
This
would violate the first prong of the test because disregarding a
regulation mandating a predetermined course of action involves
no discretion. On the other hand, if the complaint alleges that a
government followed the regulations but determined compliance

186.
See id. at 540-42.
187.
See id. at 546-47.
188.
See id.
189. Id. at 547.
190. Id.
191.
Id. at 546.
192.
See id. at 547-48.
193.
See id.
194.
See id. at 545.
195.
See id. at 543.
196.
See id. at 544. Federal regulations at that time mandated that the DBS
could not license a polio vaccine without first testing the vaccine and determining
that it satisfies the statutory standards. See id.
197.
See id. "When a suit charges an agency with failing to act in accord
with a specific mandatory directive, the discretionary function does not apply." Id.
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incorrectly, a court must decide if the "manner and method of
determining compliance with the safety standards at issue involve
agency judgment of the kind protected by the discretionary
function exception." 19 8 This would answer the first prong of the
test in the affirmative by concluding that the government officials
did possess the latitude to invoke their own choice. However,
without more specific information, the Court could not resolve the
second prong, because it could not analyze whether public policy
of the kind intended by Congress existed. 19 9 Given the lack of
information on this issue, the Court remanded the case to the
district court for a determination of whether the NIH uses
200
judgment in issuing licenses to polio vaccine manufacturers.
Nevertheless, the Court did reveal how to apply the second
prong of the newly formulated Berkovitz test when it held that
discretionary acts could exist without the presence of specific
statutory rules.
In United States v. Gaubert, the primary
shareholder of an insolvent savings and loan (S&L) sued the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) for the negligent
supervision of the S&L's directors and mismanagement of the
S&L. 2 0 '
Unlike Varig and Berkovitz, which involved specific
federal regulatory schemes, federal regulations did not dictate the
operation of the S&L. 20 2 While applying the first prong of the
Berkovitz test, the Court held that the FHLBB used discretion in
its operation of the S&L, as the "agencies here were not bound to
act in a particular way."20 3 Thus, FHLBB managers possessed
the ability to invoke personal judgment in the operation of the
S&L.
Before concluding whether the discretionary function
exception applied to the allegedly negligent conduct, the Court
had to deal with the second prong-whether the policy judgment

198. Id. at 544-45. The Court defined "discretion of the kind protected" by
citing Varig as the discretion to "prevent judicial 'second-guessing' of legislative
and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy
through the medium of an action in tort." Id. at 539. It further illustrated the
discretion as "decisions based on considerations of public policy .
involve...
the permissible exercise of policy judgment." Id.
199.
See id.at 545.
200. Id. The briefs touched on this issue, as the plaintiffs alleged that the
NIH uses "objective scientific standards." Id. Meanwhile the government asserted
that it had employed "policy judgment." Id.
201. United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 318-20 (1991). The FHLBB
took over the management of the S&L, Independent American Savings Association
(IASA). See id. The FHLBB replaced IASA's directors and later participated in the
daly management of IASA. See id.
202. See id. at 329. Congress had provided some regulatory guidelines for
the FHLBB. See, for example, 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(A), enumerating particular
grounds for appointing a conservator or receiver but granting the power to
determine whether those grounds existed in "the opinion of the Board." Gaubert,
499 U.S. at 329. But see supranotes 163, 173, 196 and accompanying text.
203. Gaubert,499 U.S. at 329.
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employed by the FHLBB managers was the kind that Congress
20 4
intended to protect.
During its application of the second prong in Gaubert, the
Court
continued
its
dissipation
of
Indian
Towing's
planning/operational distinction by concluding that discretionary
acts could exist on an operational level. In reversing the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court held
that the determining question in deciding the discretionary
function
exception's
applicability
was
not
the
planning/operational differentiation but whether the decision in
question involved any broad public policy judgements.2 0 5 The
Fifth Circuit had stated that because the alleged negligent acts
occurred in the daily management of the S&L, the discretionary
function exception did not bar suit and that daily management
fell under the operational branch of Indian Towing's
20 6
planning/operational standard.
Citing the fact that the FHLBB based its decisions regarding
the S&L's management on "considerations of public policy," the
Supreme Court held that the alleged negligent acts involved
significant policy judgments. 20 7 The Court cited broad policy
judgments including the desire to protect the S&L industry at
large by insuring public confidence and protecting the assets of
the depositors at the S&L. 20 8 These considerations implicated
"social, economic, or political policies" that necessarily force an
affirmative answer to the second prong.2 0 9 Thus, the
discretionary function exception prohibited Gaubert from
pursuing the United States under the FTCA. 210 However, the
Court went one step further when analyzing the second prong of
the Berkovitz test. The Court created a presumption that when
there has already been a finding of discretion, the discretionary
function exception will immunize the government. 2 1 ' In other
words, a court will presume the satisfaction of the second prong,
if the first prong has been satisfied. However, the Court limited
this presumption's existence to when the first prong has been

204.
See id. at 332.
205.
See id. at 325-26.
206.
See id. at 326.
207.
Id. at 332-33. Some of these decisions included the replacement of
1ASA's management because the FHLBB desired to protect the insurance fund.
See id. at 332. They also converted the IASA to a federally chartered institution
because the FHLBB wanted the protection of federal oversight. See id. at 332-33.
208.
See id. at 332 (citing Gaubert v. United States, 885 F.2d 1284, 1290

(5th Cir. 1989)).
209.
210.
211.

Id.
See id. at 334.
See id. at 324.
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satisfied through "established governmental policy, as expressed
212
or implied by statute, regulation, or agency guidelines."
However, in a partial concurrence in Gaubert,Justice Scalia
altered the majority's implementation of the Berkovitz test in two
respects. 2 13
First, Justice Scalia opined that a court could
examine the status of the decisionmaker. 2 14 Scalia argued that a
decision made by a high government official leads to a
presumption that the decision satisfies both of Berkovitz's
prongs. 2 15 Since the FHLBB guidelines for the management of
the S&L were based on economic considerations made by the
high-ranking FHLBB, Justice Scalia agreed with the majority that
the discretionary function exception immunized the government
from Gaubert's allegations. 2 16
Second, in reinforcing the
Berkovitz test, Justice Scalia agreed that a decision must not only
involve discretion, but also must be "grounded in social,
economic, [or] political policy," to receive immunity.2 1 7 In order to
determine when a decision is "grounded in social, economic, [or]
political policy," Justice Scalia argued that a court should
examine the planning/operation distinction.2 1 8 Justice Scalia
believed that this distinction was significant because decisions
normally made at an operational level often do not employ broad
2 19
public policy discretion.

212. Id. at 324. With this limitation covering "implied" statutes, regulations,
or guidelines as well as "express" statutes, regulations, or guidelines, one may
wonder about the purpose of the limitation in the first place. After all, limitation
by implication seems to pose a paradoxical problem.
213.
See id. at 335 (Scalia, J. concurring in part and in the judgment).
214. See id. at 336. This argument directly conflicts with Varig where the
Court stated that the "nature of the conduct, rather than the status of actor" is
analyzed in assessing whether the discretionary function exception applies. See
supranote 167 and accompanying text.
215. See Gaubert,499 U.S. at 337.
216. See id. at 338-39.
217. Id. at 335 (quoting Varig, 467 U.S. at 814); see also supra notes 171-77
and accompanying text.
218. See Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 335. "This test, by looking not only to the
decision but also to the officer who made it, recognizes that there is something to
the planning vs. operational dichotomy." IL at 335.
219. See id. at 335. Justice Scalia illustrated his point by referring to the
facts of Dalehite, which first invoked the planning/operational distinction. See id.
at 335-36. He noted that that the
dock foreman's decision to store bags of fertilizer in a highly compact
fashion is not protected by this exception because, even if he carefully
calculated considerations of cost to the Government vs. safety, it was not
his responsibility to ponder such things; the Secretary of Agriculture's
decision to the same effect is protected, because weighing those
considerations is his task.
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While Supreme Court discretionary function exception
caselaw has taken a convoluted path over the fifty years of the
FTCA's existence, the Court has formulated the manageable twopronged Berkovitz test as a foundation. Despite Justice Scalia's
attempts to preserve Indian Towing's planning/operational
distinction and incorporation of the decisionmaker's position,
Berkovitz and Gaubert have solidified the two-pronged test as the
constitutional criteria that courts apply to discretionary function
exception issues.2 20 The first prong of the test is sufficiently
straight-forward, as it often turns on whether the regulations
leave room for a government employee to exercise discretion.
However, the second prong appears to be where most of the
confusion originates because the decisions must be grounded in
social, political, and economic considerations to receive
immunity. While this definition provides some guidance, the
second prong still gives lower courts an opening to create their
own formula for resolving whether the discretionary function
exception protects an allegedly negligent government activity.
Therefore, an analysis of U.S. Courts of Appeals caselaw is
necessary to discern how lower courts have applied the Berkovitz
double-pronged test.
221
B. Analysis by the U.S. Courts of Appeals

1. Actions Resulting from a Series of Decisions
In applying the Berkovitz test, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit tackled the issue of which decision amidst a

220.
Even though both Berkovitz and Gaubert employ the two-pronged test,
this Note will refer to the test as the Berkovitz test for clarity. See generally supra
note 179 and accompanying text; infra note 323 and accompanying text.
221.
This Note does not attempt to provide a comprehensive survey of each
U.S. Court of Appeals discretionary function exception caselaw. For exhaustive
analysis, see generally Ziliman, supra note 28; Hackman, supra note 179. This
Note addresses only those Courts of Appeals cases that (1) were handed down after
the Supreme Court's latest discretionary function exception case-Gaubert (which
refined the Berkovitz test), (2) differ substantially from the Supreme Court's
Berkouitz test, and (3) are relevant to the GPS hypothetical in this Note. The
confusion surrounding the Berkovitz test has caused most Courts of Appeals to
alter the Berkovitz test in a manner that meets these three limitations. Thus the
only Courts of Appeals that this Note will not address are the Second, Seventh,
and Eighth Circuits. These three circuits have not substantially altered the
Berkovitz test after Gaubert or dealt with issues that would be particularly helpful
to our GPS analysis. Nevertheless, for discretionary function caselaw from the
Second Circuit, see Leuis v. Babcock Indus., Inc., 985 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1993). For
discretionary function caselaw from the Seventh Circuit, see Calderon v. United
States, 123 F.3d 947 (7th Cir. 1997); Grammatico v. United States, 109 F.3d 1198
(7th Cir. 1997); Maas v. United States, 94 F.3d 291 (7th Cir. 1996); Rothrock v.
United States, 62 F.3d 196 (7th Cir. 1995). For a discussion of discretionary
function caselaw from the Eighth Circuit, see infra notes 268, 273 and
accompanying text.
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string of judgments involved in an allegedly negligent act a court
must analyze. In Fisher Bros. Sales, Inc. v. United States,2 22 a
series of decisions made by the FDA Commissioner led to the
eventual ban of the importation of supposedly contaminated
Chilean fruit. 2 23 The FDA instituted the ban after discovering a
grape containing cyanide. 2 2 4 However, subsequent tests could
not confirm the presence of the cyanide or any other poisoned
grapes. 2 25 Consequently, Chilean fruit growers and exporters
along with U.S. importation firms sued the United States under
the FTCA. 2 26 Under the first prong-whether the decisionmaker
had discretion-the court focused on the fact that it was the FDA
Commissioner who decided to ban the Chilean fruit.22 7 A person
in that position obviously possesses the ability to make value
2 28
judgments independent of any statutory-based provision.
Under the second prong, given the risk involved caused by
allowing contaminated food reach the market and the time
pressures of the situation, the Third Circuit determined that "2the
29
decision was an "inherent part of the policymaking process.
Therefore, the discretionary function exception immunized the
government from liability. 2 30 However, the plaintiffs attempted an
end run around the discretionary function exception by alleging
that the decision leading to the ban was not the FDA
Commissioner's, but the decision was "based on" negligent
laboratory tests that found one grape containing cyanide. 2 3 1 The
plaintiffs claimed that the FDA would not have banned the

222. 46 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 1995).
223. See id. at 282-83. An anonymous person called the United States
Embassy in Santiago, Chile and reported that he had laced fruit bound for the
United States with cyanide. See id. at 282.
224. See FisherBros., 46 F.3d at 283.
225. See id.
226. See id
227. See id. at 285.
228. See id.; see also supra notes 214-16 and accompanying text (explaining
Justice Scalia's concurrence in Gaubert where he noted that a person's position
can influence the outcome of the Berkovitz test).
229. FisherBros., 46 F.3d at 285.
230. See id.
231. See id. at 283; see also General Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 139
F.3d 1280, 1282-86 (9th Cir. 1998); Block v. Sacramento Clinical Labs, Inc., 182
Cal. Rptr. 438 (Ct. App. 1982) (involving a plaintiff who attempted a similar end
run by attacking the preparer of a report). In General Dynamics Corp. v. United
States, a defense contractor sued the United States under the FTCA for
reimbursement of attorney's fees incurred in defending a fraud prosecution and its
related civil action. See General Dynamics, 139 F.2d at 1281-82. General
Dynamics attempted to recharacterize its injury by alleging that the harm
stemmed from how prosecutors gathered their information. See id. at 1286.
"Where, as here, the harm actually flows from the prosecutor's exercise of
discretion, an attempt to recharacterize the action as something else must fail.
And there can be no doubt that the buck stopped at the prosecutors." Id. at 1286.
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had not negligently performed
Chilean fruit if the lab technicians
23 2
the tests on the grapes.
The court ruled that the plaintiff's end-run argument could
not stand for four reasons. First, allowing claims to proceed
under the FTCA for actions "based on" underlying decisions
would essentially eliminate the purpose of the discretionary
function exception. 23 3
Instead of reducing "judicial secondguessing," a goal of the discretionary function exception stated in
23 4
Varig, the plaintiffs' end run would increase judicial review.
Second, if liability were found in this case, courts would be
swamped in discovery, because to adequately try allegations such
as the one asserted by the plaintiffs, there would have to be an
examination of the source of each policy decision. 23 S This runs
counter to the Supreme Court's reasoning in Gaubert,where the
Court prevented inquiry into decisionmakers' "subjective intent in
23 6
exercising the discretion conferred by statute or regulation."
Third, finding liability in this context would create a chilling effect
that would impair the ability of high-level government officials to
perform their duties. 23 " Fourth, the present case differed from
Berkovitz in which the decision violated established regulations
that had removed the official's discretion. 23 8 Consequently, the
Third Circuit found that the only decision to be analyzed under
the discretionary function exception was the one that actually led
239
to the putative injury.
However, the dissent in FisherBros. believed that Berkovitz
controlled the instant case because the tests on the grapes
paralleled the tests on the polio vaccine. 2 4° The dissent received
six of the thirteen votes of the Third Circuit that specifically
reargued the case en banc.24 1 In writing for the dissent, Judge
Roth concluded that the proper way to determine which decision

232.
See FisherBros., 46 F.3d at 283. See generally Richard H. Seamon,
Causationand the DiscretionaryFunction Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act,
30 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 691 (1997) (analyzing the proximate causation issues with
torts under the FTCA's discretionary function exception, which relates to this

discussion of how to discern which decision among a string of them should be
analyzed under the Berkovitz test because the allegedly negligent act should be
the cause of the damage to the plaintiff).
233. See FisherBros., 46 F.3d at 286.
234. See id.
235. See id.
236. Id. (citing Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325).
237. See id. at 287.
238. See id. The plaintiffs argued that Berkovitz controlled in the instant
case because the laboratory test was in effect a regulation that deprived the FDA
Commissioner of his discretion. See id. However, the court stated that a test in
no way removed the Commissioner's discretion. See id.
239. See id. at 288.
240.

See id. at 289.

241.

See id.
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deserves analysis is to consider whether the decision necessarily
relies on scientifically reliable and accepted tests. 2 42 If the tests
were necessary to make the decision, Judge Roth argued that the
discretionary function exception should not apply to "actions
which predictably follow from the test results."2 4 Thus,
judgments based upon implicit test results would lack the choice
and independent review required for the resulting actions to
2
receive immunity under the discretionary function exception. "
2. A Presumption of Finding a Decision Grounded in Public
Policy
While the Third Circuit addressed which decisions to use in
the Supreme Court's Berkovitz test, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit has virtually created a new test by expanding
both prongs of the analytical fork and disregarding the Supreme
Court's pertinent statements of law. In Bernaldes v. United
States, a mineworker died in a mine that had safety violations. 24 5
The estate of the worker sued the United States for the Mine
Safety and Health Administration's (MSHA) negligent mine
inspection. 2 4 In applying the first prong of the test, the court
stated that while the MSHA regulations mandated certain
requirements, the regulations still left room for a mine inspector's
judgement, such as whether a danger of falling is enough of a risk
to require the use of safety belts. 2 4 7 However, this statement
directly conflicts with Gaubert, in which the Supreme Court
stated that the "focus of the inquiry is not on the agent's
subjective intent in exercising the discretion conferred by statute
2 48
or regulation, but on the nature of the actions taken."
Moreover, when the Bernaldes court addressed the second
prong of the analysis, it automatically assumed that the second
prong is satisfied if the first prong is met. The Fourth Circuit
misinterpreted Gaubert's statement that acting in furtherance of
public policy "must be presumed" when a court finds that a
government employee possessed discretion. 2 4 9 Consequently, the
Fourth Circuit held that the estate could not proceed with its suit
under the FTCA. 25 0

242.
243.
1995).
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

See id.
Fisher Bros. Sales, Inc. v. United States, 46 F.3d 279, 289 (3d Cir.
See id.
81 F.3d 428 (4th Cir. 1996).
See id.
See id. at 429.
499 U.S. 315, 325 (1991).
See Bemaldes, 81 F.3d at 429.
See id.
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The Fourth Circuit's reasoning is flawed for one primary
reason. Gaubert specifically states that there is a presumption of
the second prong's satisfaction and not an automatic
assumption. 2 5 1 If the first prong of the Berkovitz test were
dispositive of the discretionary function exception's applicability,
there is no reason for the Supreme Court to have created two
prongs. Whatever the reasoning behind the opinion, the Fourth
Circuit in Bernaldes has added to the already convoluted
database of discretionary function exception caselaw.
Meanwhile, in a strikingly similar case to Bernaldes, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reached the opposite
conclusion by applying both prongs of the Berkovitz test. In
Myers v. United States, the estates of several mineworkers sued
the MSHA for negligently inspecting a coal mine. 2 52 Similar to
the Bernaldes court, the Myers court referred to the "if/then
logical structure" of the federal MSHA regulations granting the
inspectors the necessary discretion. 25 3
Since the MSHA
inspectors must exercise judgment in applying each regulation,
25 4
the court found the first prong of the Berkovitz test satisfied.
In applying the second prong of the test, the Myers court cited the
strong presumption in favor of finding discretion in furtherance of
public policy once the first prong established discretion. 2 55
Myers differed from Bemaldes, however, by citing the
Supreme Court's statement that the presumption was
"rebuttable. " 25 6 The Sixth Circuit then rejected the presumption
because if it accepted the presumption, similar to Bernaldes, the
discretionary function exception would swallow the FTCA as a
whole. 25 7
The court found that the discretionary function

251.
See Gaubert,499 U.S. at 324.
252.
17 F.3d 890 (6th Cir. 1994). The plaintiffs sued the MSHA for its
failure to perform seven 'mandatory non-discretionary" duties arising from federal
safety regulations. Id. at 893. For example, the plaintiffs' first claim alleged that
the MSHA did not fulfill C.F.R. § 75.316 (requiring the disapproval of 'unsafe and
inadequate ventilation plans proposed by mine operators"). See id. Inadequate
ventilation caused the explosion of methane gas that created the instant suit. See
id. at 892-93.
253. Id. at 895.
"If the mine inspector determines that a particular
condition exists, then the statutes and regulations require the inspector to take
some specific action or to choose from among a limited range of actions." Id. For
example, one of the MSHA regulations involving the 'if/then logical structure"
stated: 'if 'an especially hazardous condition' is found, then the inspectors must
conduct spot inspections once every five years. .. ." Id.
254.
See id. at 895-96.
255.
See id. at 896.
256.
Id.
257.
See id. at 897. The Myers court warned that barring the suit 'would
result in precisely the kind of sweeping application of the discretionary function
exception that the Court rejected [in Berkovitz]." See id.; see also General
Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 139 F.3d 1280, 1284 (9th Cir. 1998) (illustrating
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exception did not bar the plaintiffs claims because the MSHA
inspectors employed discretion not based on "political, social, or
economic policy." 25 8
Although the discretionary function
exception did not bar the suit, the court ruled that the plaintiffs
could not pursue their cause because Tennessee tort law did not
provide a remedy. 2 s 9
This result concurs with the FTCA's
purpose, which does not create liability but merely imposes
liability
available
to
a
"private
individual
in
similar
260
circumstances."
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has similarly
upheld the presumption of finding the second prong satisfied
after finding that the first prong was met, even when no federal
guidelines govern the alleged negligent decision. In Baldassarov.
United States, seaman Baldassaro brought a personal injury
claim against the United States after a detachable sea rail
separated from his bunk.2 6 1
Although Baldassaro sued the
United States under the Suits in Admiralty Act (SAA), which lacks
a
discretionary function exception, the court implied a
discretionary function into the SAA. 2 6 2 In analyzing whether the

the concern of the discretionary function exception swallowing up the rule of the
FTCA).
258. Myers, 17 F.3d at 896-97. The court decided that the inspectors did
not exercise the proper discretion after comparing the case at bar with Gaubert.
See id. at 897. The Myers court highlighted Gaubert, where the bank officers'
discretion related to the broad policy concerns of protecting the banking industry
and preserving consumer confidence. See id. at 898. The same level of discretion
was not given to the MSHA inspectors because Congress and the Secretary of
Labor had considered the broad policy implications. See id. Consequently, the
MSHA inspectors were just the implementers of the policy. See id.
259. See id.
at 900.
260. Id. at 899. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 specifies that the FTCA is not an
independent source of liability. See Myers, 17 F.3d at 899. Moreover, the court
noted that its discussion of the discretionary function exception before addressing
whether the state offered a common law remedy was "putting the cart before the
horse." Id. at 898.
261. 64 F.3d 206, 207 (5th Cir. 1995). Although a sea rail is primarily used
to protect a sailor from rolling out of bed during heavy weather, they can also
serve as hand rails. See id. at 210. The railing was at the foot of the bed, and the
seaman claimed that the failure to secure the railing was the negligent act. See id.
at 207. The original design of the ship in question, the Cape Carthage, specified
permanent sea rails. See id. However, this design was considered too new and
expensive when the Cape Carthagewas built in the 1960s. See id. At the time of
the injury in 1991, detachable sea rails were still the standard in American and
foreign vessels. See id. at 210. Consequently, the use of detachable sea rails
complied with the Maritime Administration's standards. See id.
262.
See id. at 208; supra notes 26, 30 and accompanying text. The Fifth
Circuit did not alter the discretionary function exception from the codified
language in the FTCA. See Baldassaro,64 F.3d at 208. This Note, however, does
not address whether the other Circuits implying a discretionary function exception
into the SAA have changed it from the one that appears in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). A
majority of Circuits have implied a discretionary function exception into the SAA.
See Chute v. United States, 610 F.2d 7, 11-13 (1st Cir. 1979); Sea-Land Serv., Inc.
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government possessed discretion, the Baldassaro court noted
that no regulations governed the use of sea rails. 2 63 Therefore,
the court concluded that the United States had the discretion
necessary to satisfy the first prong of the Berkovitz test. 2 64 In the
second prong, the Fifth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's
presumption of finding that the discretion employed was
grounded in public policy. 2 6s Although Baldassaro argued that
the installation of sea rails turned on non-public policy
considerations such as safety and comfort, the court still found
second prong of the Berkovitz test satisfied because of Gaubert's
recommendation that courts should not engage in judicial
second-guessing. 2 66 Thus the court used the policy argument of
deferring to the legislature as proof of the policy considerations
2 67
required by the second prong of the Berkovitz test.

v. United States, 919 F.2d 888, 891 (3d Cir. 1990); Wiggins v. United States, 799
F.2d 962, 966 (5th Cir. 1986); Gemp v. United States, 684 F.2d 404, 408 (6th Cir.
1982); Bearce v. United States, 614 F.2d 556, 558-60 (7th Cir. 1980); Earles v.
United States, 935 F.2d 1028, 1030-32 (9th Cir. 1991); Williams v. United States,
747 F.2d 700 (1lth Cir. 1984) (per curiam) affjg Williams ex rel. Sharpley v.
United States, 581 F. Supp. 847, 853-55 (S.D. Ga. 1983). Although the Fourth
Circuit has not explicitly read a discretionary function exception into the SAA,
Tiffany v. United States applied a discretionary function exception into the SAA
based on constitutional separation of powers concerns. 931 F.2d 271, 277 (4th
Cir. 1991).
For a review of the Circuits as of 1985 that had implied a
discretionary function exception into the SAA, see Fadely, supra note 26, at 18384. The Fifth Circuit, the Baldassarocourt, first implied a discretionary function
exception in Wiggins v. United States. 799 F.2d at 966.
263.
See Baldassaro, 64 F.3d at 209. Given the importance of federal
specifications to determine the existence of employee discretion, the court looked
to all available sources of guidance but could discover none: "there are no
statutes, regulations, policies, guidelines, or Maritime Administration (MARAD)
standards that require sea rails to be attached permanently to the bunks .

Id.
264.
See id. Although the court found the lack of standards as convincing
evidence for finding discretion, it also cited the history of the Cape Carthage's
construction and later purchase by MARAD as evidence of discretion by the
United States. See id. at 209-10.
265.
See id. at 211. The court stated that "the appropriate inquiry is
whether the act in question is 'susceptible to policy analysis." See id. (emphasis
added).
266.
See id. The court noted that almost any government decision (ie., the
installation of sea rails on a ship) could be reduced to such minute components so
as to avoid a connection to the broad policy decisions that Congress intended the
discretionary function exception cover. See id. It stated, however, that "[w]e are
neither in a position-nor do we desire to be-to dissect and second-guess each
discreet aspect of a total design package that is grounded in policy considerations
pertaining to national defense." Id. at 211-12.
267.
See id. at 210-11.

408
3.

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 33:371

2 68
Protection for "Unique Government Functions"

Other U.S. Courts of Appeals, however, have not followed
Supreme Court caselaw quite as closely as the Fifth Circuit. In
fact, they have ignored the Supreme Court's dicta to refrain from
immunizing "unique government functions." In Faber
v. United
States, Todd Faber sued the United States for failure to post no
diving signs at Coronado National Forest.2 6 9 In this case, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that if the
"government can prove that the actions taken by its employees
consisted of the unique functions and responsibilities of the
government, then the government cannot be held liable under the
FTCA even if a private individual would be held liable."2 70 This
statement conflicts with the Supreme Court when the Court
rejected the "unique government function" argument in Indian
Towing by stating that "all Government activity is inescapably
kmiquely governmental' in that it is
performed by the
271
Government."
In order to create protection for a "unique government
function," the Ninth Circuit used the second prong of the
Berkovitz test to examine whether the discretion employed by the
Forest Service implicated public policy considerations. 2 72 Since

268. Hackman, supra note 179, at 438-39 argues that the Eighth Circuit
has carved out protection for "unique government functions" in Appley Bros. v.
United States, 7 F.3d 720, 726-27 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that the discretionary
function exception did not bar a claim that the United States negligently inspected
a grain warehouse) and Tonelli v. United States, 60 F.3d 492, 496 (8th Cir. 1995)
(holding that the discretionary function exception bars a claim alleging the
negligent hiring of a postal employee but does not bar a claim alleging the
negligent investigation of mail tampering). However, neither Appley nor Tonelli
even mention the phrase "unique government function." See generally Tonell4 60
F.3d 492; Appley Bros., 7 F.3d 720.
269. 56 F.3d 1122, 1123 (9th Cir. 1995). Todd Faber dove from a rock ledge
at the Tanque Verde Falls in Coronado National Forest. See id. Faber dove to a
pool 20 feet below the ledge. See id On the way down, Faber struck his head and
became a quadriplegic. See id. At the top of the falls, four different signs warned
of general danger and the threat of natural disasters such as flash flooding and
slippery rocks. See id. However, no signs specifically mentioned the danger of
diving. See id. at 1123-24.
270. 56 F.3d 1122, 1124 (9th Cir. 1995). The court relied on a House of
Representatives report that noted that "[tihe purpose of the discretionary function
exception is to protect the ability of the government to proceed with
decisionmaking in carrying out its unique and vital functions without 'secondguessing' by the courts as to the appropriateness of its policy choices." Id. at
1124 (emphasis added) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1015, 101st Cong. 2d Sess. 134
(1991)).
271.
Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64-65 (1956). The
FTCA makes the United States liable "in the same manner and to the same extent
as a private individual under like circumstances. ... " 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1994).
272.
See Faber,56 F.3d at 1124-25. The court found that the government
did not satisfy the first prong of the Berkovitz test because the Forest Service had
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the decision not to install a warning sign involved "considerations
2 73
of safety, not public policy," the exception did not apply.
Although it did not protect a 'unique government function" in
Faber,the court stated that the discretionary function exception
should protect the government when it engages in "unusual
situations where the government was required to engage in broad,
policymaking activities or to consider unique social, economic,
and political circumstances...." 27 4 By reformulating the second
prong of the Berkovitz test to include "unique" policy
considerations, the Ninth Circuit has expanded the
test by
27 5
immunizing the government for its unique functions.
While not specifically mentioning a "unique government
function," the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
applied the discretionary function exception to the exclusive
government activity of the Postal Service. In Hughes v. United
States, a post office patron sued the United States when she was
shot at a U.S. post office. 276 The plaintiff alleged that the United

no discretion to exercise. See id. at 1126-27. As of January 1993, six of the sixtyseven accidents occurring at the Falls were diving accidents. See id. at 1126 n.3.
Therefore, the Forest Service had created a site management plan that specified
remedying the lack of no diving signs at the Falls. See id. at 1126. Since the
Forest Service's actions contradicted its own plan, it was not exercising discretion.
See id. Nevertheless, the court continued with the Berkovitz test and applied the
second prong. See id. at 1127.
273.
Id. at 1125; Aslakson v. United States, 790 F.2d 688, 693 (8th Cir.
1986) (determining that the discretionary function exception does not apply when
the challenged government action involves safety rather policy considerations).
274.
Faber,56 F.3d at 1125; see also Lesoeur v. United States, 21 F.3d 965,
970 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the discretionary function exception applies
because of the unusual circumstances surrounding the government's failure to
warn). In Lesoeur, the plaintiff sued for a failure to warn that the rafting tours in
a national park were not regulated. See Lesoeur, 21 F.3d at 967. Since the
Hualapi Indian Tribe operated the tours, the court held that the decision not to
warn about the lack of regulation involved broad policy considerations. See id. at
970. Given that a warning about the lack of regulation could have caused
hostility between the Forest Service and the Tribe, the Lesoeur court found the
Forest Service's decision possessed the necessary broad policy implications. See
id.; see also In re Consolidated Atmospheric Testing, 820 F.2d 982, 997 (9th Cir.
1987) (holding that the discretionary function exception applies since "the
decision whether to issue warnings to thousands of test participants of possibly
life-threatening dangers [related to radiation stemming from the atomic detonation
in Hiroshima] ... calls for the exercise of judgment and discretion at high levels of
government."). Meanwhile in Faber,the court did not find circumstances similar
to Lesoeur or In re ConsolidatedAtmospheric Testing to warrant the application of
the discretionary function exception. Faber,56 F.3d at 1127-28.
275.
56 F.3d at 1127. Inserting the word 'unique" into second prong of the
Berkovitz test differs from the Supreme Court's statement of the second prong that
the decision be 'grounded in social, economic, and political policy." Berkovitz v.
United States, 486 U.S. 531, 537 (1988) (quoting United States v. Varig, 467 U.S.
797, 814 (1984)).
276.
110 F.3d 765, 766 (11th Cir. 1997). In Hughes, Mary Jo Hughes was
shot in her car after she had checked her mail in her post office box at 10:45pm.
See id.
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States was negligent in not providing the necessary security at a
post office with twenty-four hour mailbox access. 27 7 After finding
that the post office had the necessary discretion to satisfy the first
prong of the Berkovitz test, the court examined whether the
discretion was "susceptible to policy analysis."2 78 In finding the
second prong of the Berkovitz test satisfied because the post
office's discretion involved broad policy implications, the court
cited a Congressional mandate directing the Postal Service to
"bind the Nation together through the personal, educational,
literary, and business correspondence of the people." 2 7 9 An
agency established not only to deliver the nation's mail but also to
"bind the Nation" necessarily performs a "unique government
function." Therefore, one could argue that Hughes stands for the
proposition that whenever an agency engages in an activity
uniquely provided by the government,
the discretionary function
28 0
exception immunizes it from liability.
4. "Unique Government Functions" in a Military Context
Meanwhile, other U.S. Courts of Appeals have even included
military activities within the scope of "unique government
functions." In Black Hills Aviation, Inc. v. United States, the father

of a civilian pilot sued the Army for the negligent investigation of
his son's crashed airplane that was legally flying over the White
Sands Missile Range. 2 8 ' After finding that no military regulation
277.
See id. The complaint alleged lack of security, inadequate lighting in
the building and parking lot, and the negligent maintenance of shrubs provided
concealment for criminals. See id.
278. Id. at 768.
The court examined the pertinent Postal regulations
regarding the operation of U.S. Post Offices. See id. The Postal Operations
Manual, § 221.2.23 (Issue 5, Jan. 31, 1983) states "[alt the postmaster's
discretion, lobbies may remain open when no one is on duty to allow customer
access to post office boxes and self service equipment, provided customer safety,
security provisions and police protection are deemed adequate." Hughes, 110
F.3d at 768.
Federal regulations establish a security control office to be
"responsible for the general security of the post office, its stations and branches,
in accordance with rules and regulations issued by the Chief Postal Inspector." Id.
Consequently, the court found the first prong satisfied since the security control
officer was granted the discretion to decide if the security measures were
adequate. See id.
279.
Id. 39 U.S.C. § 101(a) charged the Postal Service with this mandate.
See id.
280.
It bears noting that the duties of the Post Office are no longer unique
given the presence of private mail delivery companies such as FedEx, UPS, and
others.
At the time of its creation, however, Congress probably did not
contemplate that private carriers would become as prevalent as they are today.
Nevertheless, Congress' idea of the Post Office "binding" the nation still applies,
albeit to a lesser degree.
281.
34 F.3d 968, 970 (10th Cir. 1994). The airplane was a fire-suppression
tanker that the Army had called to extinguish a fire started by a missile explosion.
See id. The range tests ground-to-air missiles for the Forward Area Air Defense
System. See id. at 970-71. The father could not investigate the crash himself
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mandated an investigation into civilian crashes, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit concluded that any investigation
into the crash at issue was discretionary. 2 8 2 Therefore, the28 first
3
prong of the Berkovitz test requiring discretion was satisfied.
In analyzing whether the discretion qualified under the
second prong of the Berkovitz test, the Tenth Circuit examined
the concerns of the military and its unique role as provider of
The Tenth Circuit noted three policy
national defense. 2 84
considerations raised by the Army that are exclusive to its
duties.2 8 5 First, the Army referred to its limited resources to
Second, the Army cited its lack of
investigate accidents. 28 6
expertise in investigating accidents.2 8 7 Third, the Army stated its
desire to resume missile testing as soon as possible instead of
28 8
investigating a civilian crash.
In examining the third reason why the decision not to
investigate the crash involved broad policy considerations, 2 89 the
In
Tenth Circuit cited Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.2 9 0
the
balancing
of
military
Boyle, the Supreme Court permitted
concerns such as "the trade-off between greater safety and
greater combat effectiveness" within the context of the
Since the White Sands
discretionary function exception. 2 9 1

given the classified nature of the missile range. See id. at 971. He was allowed
only an overflight of the wreckage, a visit to the site with a Public Affairs officer,
and visits to remove parts of the wreckage. See id. The father alleged that the
military failed to investigate the cause of the crash, destroyed evidence in the case,
and committed the tort of trespass to chattel or conversion regarding the
airplane's wreckage. See id. at 970. After independently hiring accident experts
to investigate the crash, the father gathered evidence that created a suspicion that
the Army accidentally shot down the airplane. See id. at 971-72.
See id. at 973-76. The father argued that the Army owed a duty to
282.
investigate the crash as a "Legal Mishap Investigation" under DOD instruction
6055.7(E)(2)(a)(2)(c), or as a "Safety Mishap" under DOD Instruction 6055.7
(E)(2)(a)(2)(a)-(b) or an 'AR 15-6" investigation under DOD Instruction 6055.7. See
id. at 973. The court, however, found that the regulations did not apply because
the crash did not qualify as a "mishap" under the provisions of DOD Instruction
6055.7. See id. at 976.
283.
See id.
284.
See icE
The Tenth Circuit applied a straightforward Berkovitz
approach, as it stated that for the second prong to be satisfied, the discretion
must be "based upon considerations of public policy." Id. (quoting Berkovitz v.
United States, 486 U.S. 531, 537 (1988)).
285.
See id. at 976.
286.
See id.
See id.
287.
288.
See id.
289.
See id.
290.
487 U.S. 500, 511 (1988).
291.
Id. Boyle held that the choice of design on military equipment falls
within the discretionary function exception because it necessitates the "balancing
of many technical, military, and even social considerations, including specifically
the trade-off between greater safety and greater combat effectiveness." Id.
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officials factored the impediments of investigating the civilian
crash into the Army's combat effectiveness, the Black Hills court

292
held that the second prong of the Berkovitz test was satisfied.
By using combat effectiveness as a legitimate reason why a
decision involves broad policy considerations, Black Hills seems to
conclude that a FTCA claim against the military will always fall
under the discretionary function exception. Consequently, the
implications of the Supreme Court's decision in Boyle could
298
extend beyond the Tenth Circuit's holding in Black Hills.
The extension of Boyle through Black Hillshas extended to at
least one more circuit. In Crumpton v. Stone,2 9 4 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the discretionary
function exception immunized the U.S. Army for its disclosure of
investigative records. 29 5 The widow of the officer who had his
personnel records released sued the United States for invasion of
privacy and infliction of severe emotional distress. 29 6 The widow's
allegations of negligence centered on a newspaper's Freedom of

292.
See Black Hls, 34 F.3d at 976.
293. See id. But see Hackman, supra note 179, at 443 (arguing that Tew v.
United States, 86 F.3d 1003 (10th Cir. 1996) actually reformulates the Berkovitz
test to include unique governmental duties). As support for her proposition,
Hackman cites the court's statement of the issue: 'whether these alleged
governmental duties fulfill the two requirements of the discretionary function
exception." See Hackman, supra note 179, at 443 (quoting Tew, 86 F.3d at 1005).
Hackman argues that the inclusion of 'governmental duties" into the issue
implicates the requirement that the discretionary function exception applies only
to "unique governmental activities." See Hackman, supra note 179, at 443. In
Tew, a mother brought a wrongful death suit against the Coast Guard for its
failure to mark an underwater structure in the Illinois River. See 86 F.3d at 1004.
The mother's son drowned when his raft struck this hidden structure. See id.
However, Hackman's conclusion is incorrect for three reasons. First, the word
"governmental" was used only to describe the duties of the Coast Guard. See id.
at 1005-06. Since the Coast Guard is an entity of the United States, any duty
undertaken by the Coast Guard would bear the imprimatur of the government.
Second, the court did not use the word "unique." See id. at 1005. Third, in the
two sentences before the one cited by Hackman, the Tew court specified the twopronged Berkovitz test and then proceeded to analyze the case under that test
while never mentioning governmental duties again. See id. While Hackman's
ultimate conclusion that the discretionary function exception includes only unique
governmental activities may prove correct, her use of Tew to support this
assertion undermines the argument's credibility.
294. 59 F.3d 1400 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The case title is unique in that it is
Crumpton v. Stone instead of Crumpton v. United States. The Stone in Crumpton
v. Stone is Michael P.W. Stone, Secretary of the Army, the individual that
Crumpton was required to sue in order to obtain her desired relief. See id.
295. See id. at 1402. The medical records were of an Army officer who had
committed suicide after being investigated for "padding his travel expenses" and
"accepting gratuities." Id. The records were released pursuant to a Freedom of
Information Act request to local New Jersey newspapers. See id.
296. See id. at 1402-03. The records released to the papers included
allegations linking Crumpton to the fraud and details regarding her discovery of
and reaction to finding Col. Crumpton's body after his suicide. See id. No charges
were filed against Col. or Crumpton. See id.
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Information Act (FOIA) request that led to the disclosure of the
reports. 29 7 Noting that some exemptions to FOIA give an agency
the power to refrain from releasing information, the D.C. Circuit
held that the Army had discretion to decide whether to release its
investigation report. 2 9 8
Therefore, the Army had satisfied the
2 99
first prong of the Berkovitz test.
During the application of second prong, the court insinuated
that the military receives a degree of favoritism under the
discretionary function exception. The court held that the Army
satisfied the second prong because its unique duty of balancing a
desire for public information against the need for secrecy was a
public policy consideration involving political, social, and
economic judgments300 The court referred to this weighing test
as a "quintessential discretion function."3 0 1
Since only
government agencies are subject to the requirements of the
FOIA,30 2 one can argue that agencies engaging in unique
government functions fall within the discretionary function
exception. Or, at the very least, a plaintiff can never recover
against the government for the negligent release of information
pursuant to a FOIA request because FOIA requires the balancing
303
of disclosure against secrecy.
The U.S. military, by its very nature constantly balances the
public's desire for information with the need for secrecy.3 0 4 One
could also argue, therefore, that the logical result of Crumpton's
holding is the elimination of Berkovitz's second prong in military
contexts. Thus, the only question that would remain for a case

297.
See Id. at 1403-05. Although Crumpton alleged that Army regulations
and the Privacy Act also prohibited the disclosure of the Army reports, the court
focused its discretionary function analysis of the specifics of the FOIA request.
See id.
298.
See id. at 1404.
299.
See id. The court supported its conclusion with Mead Data Central,
Inc. v. United States, 566 F.2d 242, 258 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (stating that "the
exemptions to the FOIA are permissive rather than mandatory"). See Crimpton,
59 F.3d at 1404.
300.
See id. at 1406; see also Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S.
352, 373 (1976) (arguing that balancing the need for disclosure with secrecy is
fraught with public policy considerations).
301.
Crumpton, 59 F.3d at 1406. See also Hackman, supranote 179, at 444
(arguing that this language incorporates a "unique government function" into the
discretionary function exception).
302.
FOIA was passed by Congress as 5 U.S.C. § 522(a) and pertains to
government agencies not private citizens. See 5 U.S.C. § 522(a) (1994).
303.
See supranotes 300-02 and accompanying text.
304.
The author assumes that effective national defense necessarily requires
that the government keep some information from its own people.
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involving the military would be the first prong-whether
it
3 05
possesses discretion under the relevant statute.

5. Complexity and Current State of the Discretionary Function
Exception
The discretionary function exception is arguably the most
litigated provision of the FTCA. 30 6 However, no article or study
may be more convincing of the discretionary function exception's
complexity than the twenty-year tribulation of Gail Merchant
Irving. Irving sued inspectors at the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) for their negligent inspection of her
workplace.3 0 7 The suit arose in 1979 when Irving's hair was
sucked into the high-speed rotation of a shoemaking machine's
30 9
drive shaft.30 8 Consequently, she suffered "grievous" injuries.
After the accident, Irving sued the government and survived
the government's initial motion to dismiss based on the
discretionary function exception. 3 10
The full trial then
commenced and lasted only three days. 3 1 ' After waiting for three
years to issue an opinion, the U.S. District Court for the New
Hampshire (District Court) reversed itself by holding that the
discretionary function exception barred Irving's claim. 3 12 After
three more years, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
remanded the case back to the District Court in light of the
Supreme Court's judgment in Berkovitz. 3 13 The District Court
ruled that Berkovitz did not change the result,3

14

but the First

Circuit later vacated and remanded again concluding that further

305. This assertion assumes that counsel for the government could make a
legitimate argument that the military desire for secrecy could be weighed against
the public's thirst for information about military operations.
306.
See Payton v. United States, 679 F.2d 475, 479 (5th Cir. 1982) ('[t]his
omission [of the discretionary function exception's defimition] is understandable in
light of the fact that the courts have struggled for nearly three decades to provide
such a definition, with limited success."); LESTER S. JAYSON, 2 HANDLING FEDERAL
TORT CLAIMS § 248.01 at 12-23 (1986) (asserting that "[pirobably no other
provision of the Federal Tort Claims Act has been regarded as more difficult to
understand or to apply"); Zillman, supranote 28, at 367 (analyzing over 100 cases
involving the discretionary function exception of the FTCA); D. Scott Barash,
Comment, The DiscretionaryFunction Exception and Mandatory Regulations, 54 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1300, 1300-01 n.3 (1987) (arguing that the discretionary function
exception is the most complex provision of the FTCA).
307.
See Irving v. United States, 162 F.3d 154, 157 (Ist Cir. 1998).
308.
See id. at 157-58. Her hair was actually sucked into the machine due
to the vacuum created by the forces of the rotating machine. See id.
309.
Id. at 158.
310.
See Irving v. United States, 532 F. Supp. 840, 845 (D.N.H. 1982).
311.
See Irving, 162 F.3d at 159. The full trial began in 1985. See id.
312.
See Irving v United States, No. Civ. C81-501-SD, slip. op. (D.N.H. Jan.
27, 1988).
313.
See Irving v. United States, 867 F.2d 606 (1st Cir. 1988).
314.
See Irving, 162 F.3d at 158.
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analysis was necessary to determine if the inspectors had policylevel discretion. 3 15 After four more years, the District Court
disregarded the discretionary function exception altogether and
ruled for the United States on the merits. 3 16 A third panel of the
The
First Circuit vacated and remanded this judgment.3 17
District Court then concluded that OSHA did not have discretion
and held that the United States was liable and awarded
$1,000,000 to Irving.3 18 A divided panel of the First Circuit
affirmed the $1,000,000 judgment on April 8, 1998.319
However, the First Circuit sitting en banc reversed itself on
December 18, 1998 by holding that the discretionary function
exception had always barred Irving's claim. 320 In writing for the
majority, Judge Selya stated that "we regret only the plaintiffs
unfortunate accident and the added suffering she has endured
due to the inordinate delay and erratic decisionmaking that
321
spawned two decades of needlessly protracted litigation."
Needless to say, the most recent Irving decision demonstrates that
even after fifty years, 3 22 courts still have difficulty interpreting the
FTCA's discretionary function exception.
V. APPLICATION OF THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION
TO GPS OPERATION

An analysis of whether the discretionary function exception
protects the United States for the negligent operation of the GPS

315.
Irving v. United States, 909 F.2d 598, 603-05 (1st Cir. 1990).
316.
See Irving, 162 F.3d at 159.
317.
See Irving v. United States, 49 F.3d 830 (1st Cir. 1995).
318.
See Irving. v. United States, 942 F. Supp. 1483 (D.N.H. 1996)
319.
See Irving, 162 F.3d at 155.
320.
See iL at 169. In reaching this decision, the court looked extensively
at testimony from the trial court in 1985. See id. at 166-67. The court applied a
straightforward Berkovitz test. See ic at 162-69. First, it determined that the
OSHA regulations and guidelines gave the inspectors the necessary discretion
when examining the machines. See id. Second, once the discretion was found, it
presumed that broad policy considerations barred a suit under the FTCA. See id.
But even without the presumption, the court concluded that the broad safety
concerns made by the OSHA inspectors, such as layout of the facility, health and
safety records, and working conditions, satisfied the second prong of the Berkovitz
test. See id.
321.
See id. at 169. One wonders how needless it was after twenty years,
ten separate opinions, and five appeals to the First Circuit. See supra notes 31020 and accompanying text. During its five encounters with Irving, the First
Circuit vacated the district court three times and ruled that the discretionary
function exception barred the suit but then reversed itself eight months later. See
id.
322. The discretionary function exception was part of the original FTCA
passed on August 2, 1946 as Title IV of the Legislative Reorganization Act, 60 Stat.
842. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1946).
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32 3
should begin by applying the Supreme Court's Berkovitz test.
Before proceeding with the legal analysis, it bears repeating how
the United States could perform a negligent act with the GPS to
expose itself to potential FTCA liability. The negligent GPS act
would most likely mirror the 1992 ephemeris constant upload
error by the Master Control Station (MCS).32 4
This mistake
325
resulted in a positioning error of over three hundred meters.
Even with an error of only three hundred meters, significant
physical and economic harm could occur.3 26
Thus, an error
similar to the one in 1992 could cause numerous lawsuits against
3 27
the United States for negligent GPS operation.
Assuming an ephemeris data upload error, whether the
government can receive discretionary function protection depends
on the two-pronged Berkovitz test. However, the first problem
with a legal analysis of the GPS involves the same concern that
the Third Circuit illustrated in FisherBros.3 2 8-which decision in
a string of judgments deserves the Berkovitz test. In a GPS
context, the government would assert that, similar to the FDA
Commissioner in Fisher Bros., the decision leading to the
allegedly negligent upload was the decision of high government
32 9
officials and not of a lowly computer operator.

323. As previously mentioned, there is some debate concerning the name of
the Supreme Court's two-pronged test. See supra notes 179 and 220. The Court
first delineated the two prongs in Berkouitz. See supra notes 179 and 220.
However, the confusion stems from the fact that the second prong of the test relies
extensively on language in United States v. Varig. See supra note 183 and
accompanying text. Furthermore, the Court clarified the two-pronged test even
further in Gaubert.
See supra notes 201-12 and accompanying text.
Consequently, scholars have referred to the same two-pronged test as the
Varig/Berkovitz/Gauberttest or some combination thereof.
324. See Alsip, supranote 12, at 1-2.
325.
See id.
326. A number of GPS users would be significantly harmed with an error of
300 meters. See supranote 71 and accompanying text. Airplanes and ships need
accuracy far greater than 300 meters to safely land or dock in harbor. See supra
note 71 and accompanying text. Furthermore, a building constructed 300 meters
away from its intended location could also incur liability for the tort of trespass.
See LOGSDON, supra note 1, at 270 (explaining that some developmental uses of
GPS technology require precision of several feet).
327. The reason numerous lawsuits were not brought in 1992 is twofold.
First, in 1992, fewer civilians used GPS technology. Therefore, most of the users
were the military or the Coast Guard. Second, the presence of dGPS technology in
high GPS traffic areas such as harbors would correct for any GPS errors. See
Radionavigation Plan, supranote 5, at 3-10.
328. See Fisher Bros. Sales, Inc. v. United States, 46 F.3d 279 (3d Cir.
1995) (holding that the discretionary function exception bars a claim against the
FDA Commissioner).
329. See id. In FisherBros., the court held that the decision to be analyzed
was the FDA Commissioner's judgment and not the underlying judgments
concerning the testing of the possibly poisoned grapes. See id. at 288; see also
supra notes 222-38 and accompanying text (explaining Fisher Bros.). The Master
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However, the United States will probably not succeed
because the decision that caused the negligent upload did not
Unlike
emanate from a senior government policy official.3 3 0
Fisher Bros., where the FDA Commissioner based his decision
upon specific test results, a GPS upload is not based upon an
underlying judgment by another person. Consequently, the GPS
case more accurately parallels Varig, where FAA inspectors failed
to properly inspect an airplane.3 3 1 In Varig, the Supreme Court
analyzed the decision of the inspectors and not the larger
governing policy of the FAA. 3 32 Thus, the Berkovitz test should be
applied to the judgment of the Space Command Operators at the
33 3
MCS who actually upload the data.
Under the first prong of the Berkovitz analysis, one must
determine if the government employee has the ability to exercise
discretion in performing her duty.3 3 4 If the employee does not
possess judgment or choice, the discretionary function exception
does not bar the claim.3 3 5 The text of the governing regulation
should first be analyzed to determine if the employee has
discretion.3 3 6
The U.S. Coast Guard procedures specify "[to]
update the Nay message [regarding ephemeris data] once a day
337
and TRY not to exceed 28 hours and never 48 hours."

Control Station that updates the ephemeris data resides at Schriver AFB in
Colorado Springs, Colorado. See Navstar Global Positioning System, supra note
86.
330. While the Air Force has not confni-med this assumption, the author
believes it to be an accurate assumption of fact. Ephemeris data must be relayed
to the satellites via mundane computer commands. Therefore, an Air Force
General (the most likely counterpart to the FDA Commissioner found in Fisher
Bros.) would not be the person sitting at the terminal updating the satellites.
331.
See supranotes 173-76 and accompanying text.
332. 467 U.S. 797, 799-803 (1984).
333. The Supreme Court's Berkovitz decision directed lower courts to employ
the two-pronged Berkovitz test to analyze discretionary function cases. While this
Note argues that some courts have altered the exception to protect the government
from liability, all of the courts have based their reasoning on this two-pronged
test. Therefore, it only makes sense to analyze the government's liability for GPS
management under the general framework of the Berkovitz test.
334.
See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531,538 (1988).
335.
This assumes that the government violated a statute, regulation,
policy, or general guideline.
Twenty-eight U.S.C. § 2680(a) states that an
employee abiding by a regulation is protected regardless of whether the "statute or
regulation be valid." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1997). Therefore, a plaintiff cannot sue
the government because the employee abided by the government policy, but the
plaintiff does not agree with the policy. See id.; see also Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at
536-38.
336.
"[ljt will most often be true that the general aims and policies of the
controlling statute will be evident from the text." United States v. Gaubert, 499
U.S. 315, 324 (1991).
337.
Electronic mail from Dale Casey, TC2 U.S. Coast Guard Navigation
Center, to author (Mar. 10, 1999) (on file with the author) (emphasis in original).
A Nav message concerning ephemeris data informs civilians when the GPS's
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Assuming that this policy mirrors the policies regulating the
Space Command's ephemeris data uploads to the GPS satellites,
the regulation grants government employees discretion. Therefore,
a court would proceed to the second prong of the Berkovitz test.
However, it is also possible that the relevant regulations mandate
a strict course of conduct that leaves no discretion in the hands
of the GPS operator. Consequently, the discretionary function
exception would not apply to the suit, and the plaintiff could
338
continue her claim under the FTCA.
Assuming that the regulation grants the employee discretion,
the second prong of the Berkovitz test requires a court to
determine whether the discretion was the kind that Congress
intended to protect. 3 39
As stated by Gaubert, there is a
presumption of finding the second prong of Berkovitz satisfied
once discretion has been found in the first prong. 34 ° While this
presumption of finding broad policy considerations exists, it could
be rebutted in a GPS lawsuit. 34 1 Three questions must be
answered to determine if the government can receive
discretionary function exception
protection by satisfying
Berkovitz's second prong: (1) Does the decision involve broad

satellites have received the update of their ephemeris data. See id. The guidelines
used by the Air Force Space Command to update the ephemeris data of the GPS
are classified even in light of a Freedom of Information Act Request. See H.R. REP.
105-37, at 14-16 (1997).
However, the author acquired all of the available
unclassified information from the Interface Control Document of the Navstar GPS
(ICD-GPS-200), which was requested via electronic mail from the United States
Coast Guard's Navigation Center at webmastersmtp.navcen.uscg.mil. While the
ICD-GPS-200 document does not detail the procedures required to update the
ephemeris constant data of the GPS satellites, it provides some of the
specifications for the interface between the Air Force Space Command and the
current Block II satellites in the GPS constellation.
The existence of these
concrete specifications illustrate that the necessary guidelines for updating the
ephemeris constant may not leave too much room for discretion by the Air Force
Space Command operator. Consequently, the first prong of the Berkovitz test may
not be satisfied.
338.
See Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 324. Without the discretionary function
exception to bar the claim, a plaintiff could sue the government under relevant
state tort law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1997). However, one should remember
that the FTCA only exposes the United States to liability of a private citizen in
similar circumstances. See supra note 260 and accompanying text. Consequently,
a plaintiff suing the United States for negligent GPS operation would still have to
win under tort law (proving the elements of duty, breach, cause, and damage).
This Note does not attempt to analyze whether the United States would be liable
under tort law for negligent GPS operation but analyzes only if the FTCA would
permit such a suit to proceed.
339.
See Varig, 486 U.S. at 536. To satisfy the second prong, the judgment
must be grounded in "social, economic and political policy." Id. at 536-37.
340.
See Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 324.
341.
See supra notes 252-60 and accompanying text (agreeing with the
Supreme Court that the presumption is rebuttable). But see notes 244-50 and
accompanying text (asserting that the presumption is not rebuttable).
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public policy considerations? (2) Who makes the decision? (3) Is
GPS operation a "unique government function"?
A. Does the Decision Involve Broad PublicPolicy Considerations?
First, the GPS hypothetical differs from Varig in that a GPS
operator's decision to upload the ephemeris data may not
implicate broad policy implications.
A GPS operator merely
follows a prescribed procedure to update the satellites.
By
contrast, the FAA inspectors in Varig had to determine the
amount of time spent on each inspection in light of the lack of
inspectors compared to the number of airplanes and the amount
of deference given to a third-party, the airplane manufacturer. a 4 2
A GPS operator does not have to balance similar policy concerns.
Since the Court found that the discretionary function exception
applied in Varig, it appears that the discretionary function
exception may not protect GPS operators, who do not consider
broad "social, economic and political judgments" required by
Berkovitz's second prong. 343
The above argument makes sense after examining
Gaubert.s 44 In Gaubert, the Court found that the discretionary
function exception immunized the government because the
FHLBB had to protect the savings and loan industry at large and
ensure consumer confidence in the banking industry.- 5 Such
concerns involve the necessary broad policy concerns to satisfy
Berkovitz's second prong. A GPS operator, sitting in Colorado
electronically updating the ephemeris data, would probably not
think about public issues. However, one could argue that the
update of the ephemeris data does in fact ensure public
confidence because GPS users realize the importance of the
ephemeris data. The fact that the United States operates a
twenty-four hour GPS Navigation Service to alert users to defects
in the system justifies the idea that the GPS operators do insure
3
the public's confidence in a reliable navigational tool. "6
B. Who Makes the Decision?
The source of the allegedly negligent decision could also
determine the applicability of the discretionary function exception
to GPS operation by altering the answer to Berkovitz's second
prong.
Although never stated in a Supreme Court majority
opinion, the status of the decisionmaker--especially after the

342.
343.
536-37.
344.
345.
346.

See supranotes 174-77 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 174-77 and accompanying text; Varig, 486 U.S. at
499 U.S. 315 (1991).
See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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Third Circuit's decision in Fisher Bros.-may affect a court's
decision. In his Gaubert concurrence, Justice Scalia argued that
the relationship between the "status of the actor" and the amount
of discretion could be considered as evidence to satisfy Berkovitz's
second prong. 4 7 The level of the decisionmaker is directly
proportional to the strength of the presumption that the decision
involved public policy concerns.3 4 Four years after Scalia wrote
his opinion in Berkovitz, the First Circuit's majority in Fisher
Bros. relied upon Scalia's "status of the actor" argument to hold
that the discretionary function exception protected a decision
made by the FDA Commissioner.3 49 Therefore, the likelihood of a
court using the "status of the actor" inquiry may have
substantially increased since the Supreme Court noted in Varig
that the "nature of the conduct, not the status of the actor"
350
determines the discretionary function exception.
In a GPS lawsuit, the decisionmaker that negligently uploads
the false ephemeris data would be a lower-level Air Force officer
or enlisted person.3 5 1 Unlike the FDA Commissioner in Fisher
Bros. who banned the importation of Chilean fruit, a lower-level
Air Force operator does not possess the authority to set
government policy. 3 5 2 If a court deciding the GPS lawsuit were to
apply Scalia's "status of the actor" argument in Berkovitz, the
discretion would not be grounded in "economic, political, or social
policy."3 5 3

Berkovitz's second prong, therefore, would not be

satisfied, and the discretionary function exception would not
protect the government's negligent GPS operation.
C. Is GPS Operationa "Unique GovernmentFunction"?
Even if the government cannot receive the protection of the
discretionary function exception through a traditional Berkovitz
test, it may still qualify under the exception because of the
347. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 182; see also supra notes 213-19 and
accompanying text.
348. See Gaubert,499 U.S. at 182.
349. See Fisher Bros. Sales, Inc. v. United States, 46 F.3d 279, 285 (1995);
see also supra notes 227-30 and accompanying text.
350. United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 813 (1984). This is a
logical assumption given that the Supreme Court seems to have changed its policy
and the Third Circuit has agreed with the Court's change on examining the
.status of the actor" as evidence of broad public policy discretion. See FisherBros.,
46 F.3d at 285; see also supra notes 227-30 and accompanying text. While a
"status of the actor" inquiry may not be dispositive, at least it may be considered.
See FisherBros., 46 F.3d at 285; see also supra notes 227-30 and accompanying
text.
351.
See supra note 330 and accompanying text.
352.
See Fisher Bros., 46 F.3d at 285; supra notes 227-32 and
accompanying text.
353.
Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322; supra notes 213-15 and accompanying text
(explaining Justice Scalia's argument).
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evolving "unique government function" doctrine within Berkovitz's
second prong. Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly
protected "unique government functions," the circuits have carved
out this safe haven by referring to the Supreme Court in two
contexts. First, the circuits have gained legitimacy by inserting
the "unique government function analysis" under the Berkovitz's
second prong instead of altogether disregarding the accepted
Berkovitz test.3 5 4 Second, the circuits have used the Supreme
Court cases of Boyle and Varig as justifications for their
analysis.3 5s Thus, the circuits have not unilaterally created this
special protection but have relied, at least indirectly, on
justification from the nation's highest court. Therefore, a federal
court examining a GPS lawsuit might be more willing to apply
circuit cases such as Faber, Hughes, Black Hills, and Crumpton
since they do rely on Supreme Court precedent.
Although Faberdid not protect the government for its failure
to post no diving signs, the court concluded that it would
immunize the government in unusual circumstances requiring
"broad, policymaking activities."3 5 6 While the GPS is a powerful
tool, it also creates worldwide reliance on the United States.3 5 7 It
would appear, therefore, that the GPS is unusual in that its
potential impact on foreign policy of the United States would
3 58
implicate "broad, policymaking activities."
Furthermore, in Hughes, the Eleventh Circuit applied the
discretionary function exception because Congress in part
intended the Postal Service to provide the unique function of
servicing the country and binding it together through the mail.3 5 9
President Reagan opened the GPS in 1983 to civilians to prevent
future airplanes from straying off course, and thirteen years later,
President Clinton stated that he desired to create the GNSS, an
international network relying significantly on GPS, to bind the
world together.3 6 0
Therefore, the GPS also possesses the

354.
See supraPart IV.B.3-4.
355.
See supra notes 275, 290-91 and accompanying text.
356.
Faber v. United States, 56 F.3d 1122, 1125 (9th Cir. 1995); see supra
notes 272-75 and accompanying text.
357.
See supra Part I.
358.
Faber,56 F.3d at 1125. The GPS hypothetical also mirrors the other
Ninth Circuit case, Lesoeur v. United States. See 21 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 1994). In
Lesoeur, the court found that Berokvitz's second prong (broad public policy) was
satisfied because the Hualapi Indian Tribe's operation of the rafting tours affected
the Forest Service's decision not to post warning signs. See id. at 970. This
mirrors GPS because GPS affects sovereign nations and necessarily implicates
foreign policy of the United States. Likewise, the Lesoeur court found the U.S.
government's respect for the Hualapi's sovereignty as sufficient evidence of a
decision grounded in public policy. See id.
359.
See supra notes 276-80 and accompanying text.
360.
See supra notes 47, 78 and accompanying text.
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characteristics of unification that forced the Eleventh Circuit to
immunize the Postal Service because of its unique government
3 61
function.
Protecting the government for negligent GPS operation makes
even more sense after examining Black Hills and Crumpton, in
which the plaintiffs sued the U.S. military under the FTCA.3 6 2
After all, the GPS is inherently a military function since it receives
funding from the Department of Defense, employs Air Force
Navstar satellites, and is managed by the Air Force.3 63 In Black
Hills, the Court of Appeals relied on the need for the military to
3 64
continue with its unique function of combat effectiveness.
While the military does provide GPS to civilians, it only grants the
public access to the degraded SPS.3 65 It maintains the more
precise PPS to insure that national defense is not
compromised.3 6 6 Consequently, facing suits by civilians could
realistically impair combat readiness if the military has to weaken
its defenses to compensate for liability. Since Black Hills stated
that the need to continue missile testing was a broad public
policy consideration, another court could realistically hold that
altering the military's primary navigation tool would generate
67
broad public policy ramifications.3
Meanwhile, the military's need for secrecy in its GPS
operation could create enough of a "unique government function"
to receive immunization through the discretionary function
exception. Exposure to liability for the GPS could necessitate
revealing the technical aspects of how GPS works and thus
enable foreign countries or hackers to interrupt the signal. One
of the reasons for creating the GNSS is its resistance to
jamming.3 68
If resistance to jamming precipitates the U.S.
government to set national policy and unify with a former enemy,
then GPS operation involves broad public policy concerns.
Furthermore, the Crumpton court found Berkovitz's second
prong satisfied because of the military's need to balance secrecy
and disclosure with respect to one person.3 69 Therefore, a court
would most likely hold that the need to protect the GPS's secrecy
from the rest of the world involves broad public policy
considerations. The unique role that the military plays in the
GPS and the national defense ramifications of holding the U.S.
361.
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liable for the GPS could force a court to find the Berkovitz test
satisfied. Thus, the court would hold that the discretionary
function exception protects the government.

VI. CONCLUSION

In order for the United States to be liable under the FTCA for
the negligent operation of the GPS, a plaintiff must overcome two
hurdles. First, the plaintiff must prove that the foreign country
exception of the FTCA does not immunize the United States from
liability. This potential obstacle should not serve as too high of a
barrier since the alleged negligence would have to occur in the
United States, and Supreme Court and U.S. Courts of Appeals
caselaw state that the locus of the alleged negligence determines
the foreign country exception's applicability.3 7 0 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. United States complicates
the issue because it immunizes the United States from liability if
a court were to determine that the alleged negligence emanates
from Outer Space instead of the Master Control Station in the
United States.3 7 1
Consequently, a plaintiff, now faced with
Smith's holding, will probably need to present more technical
evidence in order to demonstrate how personnel in the United
372
States control the GPS.
The second and more cumbersome barrier to FTCA liability is
the FTCA's discretionary function exception. To overcome this
exception, a plaintiff must tame the twin-headed dragon of
Supreme Court caselaw-the Berkovitz test. Assuming that
discretion exists to satisfy Berkovitz's first prong, the battle would
then be waged under Berkovitz's second prong. After examining
the three factors raised in the GPS hypothetical, it appears that
the first two factors-whether the operator employed broad policy
concerns, and who it was that made the decision-make a case
for not applying the discretionary function exception.3 7 3
However, the unique government function argument makes a
case for applying the discretionary function exception.3 7 4 While a
relevant hypothetical court will most likely apply the framework of
Berkovitz's two-pronged test, the result will turn on what factor

370.
See supra Part III.
371.
See supranotes 126-32 and accompanying text.
372.
See supra notes 126-32 and accompanying text.
The technical
evidence would include how the GPS actually operates. See supra Part II.D
(explaining how an incorrect ephermis constant upload error emanates from the
ground control operator stationed at the MCS instead of a GPS satellite should be
sufficient evidence).
373.
See supra Part V.A-B.
374.
See supra Part V.C.
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the court emphasizes under the test, especially Berkovitz's second
prong.
Nevertheless, the variability of courts deciding
discretionary function exception cases makes it even more
3 75
difficult to predict a particular court's holding.
Therefore, it may be in Congress' best interest to take this
issue away from the courts. After all, the FTCA not only includes
the discretionary function exception in § 2680(a) but also four
additional exceptions to U.S. liability under the FTCA. Section
2680(b) exempts "[a]ny claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage,
or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter."3 76 Section
2680(i) exempts "[a]ny claim for damages caused by the fiscal
operations of the Treasury or the regulation of the monetary
system."3 77 Section 2680(1) exempts "[a]ny claim arising from the
activities of the Tennessee Valley Authority."3 7 8
Finally,
§ 2680(m) exempts "[a]ny claim arising from the activities of the
3 79
Panama Canal Company."
When the Congressional conference committee considered
these exceptions to the FTCA in 1942, they stated that "certain
classes of torts are to be excepted from the grant of the right to
sue . . . [because they] . . . relate to certain governmental
activities which should be free from the threat of damage
suits."3 0 At that time, Congress believed that the government
performed certain functions that the FTCA should not expose to
liability. 3 8 ' For example, Congress did not desire the mail system
as a whole to be interrupted or impaired because of its exposure
to civil liability.3 8 2 Therefore, Congress believed that the Postal
Service was of such high value to the successful operation of the
3 s3
country that it should be immune from the FTCA.
In 1942, no one could reasonably expect Congress to foresee
the development of the GPS. However, the GPS has become an
invaluable tool with more than a million people depending on it
every day for not only their livelihood but also their safety. Like
the Postal Service, the GPS is fast becoming a tool that not only

375. As can be seen by the discussion of the Irving case, there is no science
or absolute predictive power when it comes to discretionary function litigation.
See supra Part IV.B.5.
376. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1994).
377. Id. § 2680(i) (1994).
378. Id. § 26800) (1994).
379. Id. § 2680(m) (1994).
380. H.R. REP. No. 77-2245, at 5, 10 (1942).
381. In its published hearings, Congress did not specifically list its reasons
or motives for excluding these particular activities except that they felt that they
should be exempted from the FTCA. See id. Therefore, the author believes it is a
safe assumption to argue that it turned on the specific nature of these services.
382.
See id.; supranote 381 and accompanying text.
383.
See H.R. REP. No. 77-2245, at 5, 10; supra note 381 and accompanying
text.
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the United States but also the world needs to continue its smooth
operation and success. 38 4 Therefore, Congress should consider
adding another exception to the FTCA exempting any claim
arising out of the activities and operation of the GPS. If Congress
does not, the GPS may succumb to litigation and lose its
Thus, a revolutionary device that increases
effectiveness.38 5
productivity, efficiency, knowledge, and safety may be lost.
BrandonEricEhrhart*

384. If the United States had to abolish the GPS, many of the military's
weapons would not function (i.e. SLAMs, Tomahawks, and nuclear missile
submarines). See supra Parts I & II. Civilians from around the globe would suffer
serious harm as many people rely on GPS every day (i.e. ships for locating their
position and the landing of airplanes). See supraParts I & II.
385. Although the GPS is becoming more popular every year, it is still a
relatively new and technologically complex system. See supra Parts I & II.
Therefore, subjecting GPS to liability so early in its development runs the risk of
impairing the growth and refinement of this incredibly powerful tool.
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